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I. INTRODUCTION
Most corporate and tax lawyers know that a single economic transaction
often can be effectuated through a variety of different structures. Once a
structure is selected, query how the tax consequences of the economic
transaction should be determined. Should the tax consequences be based
on the formal legal steps chosen to accomplish the transaction (the “form”
of the transaction)? Should the tax consequences depend on the “substance”
of the transaction—a recast of the deal reflecting the “non-tax economic
relationships between the parties created, and commercial goals achieved,
by virtue of the transaction[?]”1 Or should the tax consequences be
based on a “fiction”—a set of hypothetical steps that is deemed to, but
does not actually, occur, and that is not merely a substantive recast of the
transaction?2 Whether to choose form or substance is a common
1. Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52
TAX LAW. 457, 457 n.2 (1999).
2. In an attempt to define “legal fiction,” one commentator has explained:
[Fiction’s] true nature remains difficult to state with clarity. The legal fiction
is an elusive concept because by design it must blend into its surroundings; it
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question in tax law,3 but this question rarely offers a third possible
answer—fiction. Perhaps this reflects a desire for tax analysis to be
grounded in reality, either economic reality in the case of substance, or
legal reality in the case of form. Or perhaps fiction can be viewed
merely as a subset of substance, since analyzing the substance of a
transaction requires that the tax consequences be determined on the basis
of hypothetical steps that reflect the true nature of the transaction and
that are deemed to occur. However, a fiction-based analysis can be both
legitimate and more than just a mechanism of substantive analysis.4 In
fact, the use of fiction already pervades the tax law. One commentator
explained:
Tax law is riddled with legal fictions. For example, the law “attributes”
ownership of property to one person when it is actually owned by another. It
“constructs” non-existent transfers of money between persons. It “deems”

must adapt to changing circumstances. On a philosophical level, the legal
fiction is the expression of a relation. In legal theory it may be described as a
metaphor. On a more pragmatic level, it is a falsehood deemed to be true for
limited purposes. But none of these phrases convey a concrete image. The
legal fiction is a form that draws its substance from the body of law in which it
is employed.
John A. Miller, Liars Should Have Good Memories: Legal Fictions and the Tax Code,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
3. The existing discussions in the literature about substance and form serve as a
backdrop for this Article’s discussion about formulating a coherent approach to the
application of form and fictions. See generally, e.g., Sheldon I. Banoff, Mr. Popeil Gets
‘Reel’ About Conversions of Legal Entities: The Pocket Fisherman Flycasts for “Form”
but Snags on “Substance,” 75 TAXES 887 (1997); William F. Nelson, The Limits of
Literalism: The Effects of Substance Over Form, Clear Reflection and Business Purpose
Considerations On the Proper Interpretation of Subchapter K, 73 TAXES 641 (1995);
Steinberg, supra note 1; Stephen G. Utz, Partnership Taxation in Transition: Of Form,
Substance, and Economic Risk, 43 TAX LAW. 693 (1990); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on
Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982) (book review).
However, a detailed discussion of substance over form principles is outside the scope of
this Article. This Article’s focus is not on whether and when to use substance rather than
form or form rather than substance, largely because, as discussed in greater detail below,
the varieties of each transaction discussed herein are substantively equivalent. Hence,
trying to analyze such a transaction in accordance with its substance is insufficient to
determine how it should be taxed.
4. See Miller, supra note 2, for a theoretical discussion of legal fiction as a
phenomenon of the tax law, providing, among other things, a review of some of the
relevant literature on the role of fictions in legal analysis. This Article, while informed
by such theoretical discussions, takes a more application-oriented approach and
discusses fiction as it is used and should be used in the analysis of partnership mergers,
divisions, and incorporations.
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property held for a different period of time from that for which it was actually
held. And tax law treats transfers of property “as if” they never occurred.5

Fictions can be used in many ways in tax law, from implementing
analogies that apply existing law to new facts, to making incremental
changes in the law over time.6 Moreover, as this Article will demonstrate,
fictions7 can be particularly helpful when transactions are undertaken without
a clear form, when the substance of a transaction can be effectuated
through multiple and equally plausible structures, or when there is a
desire to permit flexibility in the tax characterization of a particular
entity or event. However, throughout the Tax Code,8 and in Subchapter
K in particular,9 balancing the use of fictions with the use of substance
and form in the tax analysis of transactions remains difficult.10
This Article focuses on how substance, form, and fiction should be
used in the analysis of the tax consequences of partnership mergers,
divisions, and incorporations. Part II of this Article discusses various
forms of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations, explains the
tax constructs that are used for analyzing these forms,11 and demonstrates
that the analysis of these forms under current authority can lead to
disparate tax treatment of substantively equivalent transactions. The
constructs, as they are presently applied, incorporate an inconsistent
adherence to form and a limited use of fictions, and Part III of this
Article analyzes the policy implications of this part-form, part-fiction
5. Miller, supra note 2, at 2–3 (footnotes omitted).
6. See id. at 5–6, 26.
7. In an effort to distinguish between hypothetical steps invented solely to most
accurately reflect the substance of a transaction (as a substantive recast) from
hypothetical steps that are pure fabrication, the remainder of this Article’s use of the
term “fiction” will refer only to the latter unless specifically stated. The former will be
referred to as “substance.”
8. Unless otherwise stated, all “section” references and references to the “Code”
herein refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the Treasury regulations
promulgated thereunder.
9. Subchapter K is comprised of Sections 701 through 777 of the Code and
generally sets forth the rules dealing with the federal income taxation of partners and
partnerships.
10. See, e.g., John S. Pennell & Philip F. Postlewaite, When Hypothetical
Transactions Have Real Results—New Prop. Regs. for Subchapter K, 88 J. TAX’N 262
(1998) (discussing the rules regarding special adjustments to basis); Joseph A. Snoe,
Economic Reality or Regulatory Game Playing?: The Too Many Fictions of the § 752
Liability Allocation Regulations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1887 (1994) (discussing the
use of fictions in the analysis of the rules regarding the treatment of partnership
liabilities).
11. By “construct,” I mean the set of transactional steps, whether actual or
hypothetical, that are respected for purposes of determining the tax consequences of a
transaction. As used herein, the term “construct” does not indicate a judgment about
whether the tax analysis is based on the actual form of the transaction or whether the tax
analysis is based on a fiction.

262

FIELD.DOC

[VOL. 44: 259, 2007]

8/16/2007 10:22:29 AM

Fiction, Form, and Substance
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

approach. Specifically, Part III concludes that the existing tax rules for
the analysis of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations distort
parties’ incentives about whether and how to undertake transactions.
This distortion undermines several well-accepted tax policy goals such as
neutrality and efficiency, without materially advancing other considerations
such as simplicity and administrability. To address these policy concerns
and to rationalize the use of form and fiction in the tax analysis of
partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations, Part IV proposes that,
regardless of the actual form of the transaction, parties should be able to
elect which one of three fictions will apply for purposes of analyzing the
tax consequences of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations.
II. ANALYZING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP MERGERS,
DIVISIONS, AND INCORPORATIONS
As with many transactions, partnership mergers, divisions, and
incorporations can be effectuated through various forms under the
applicable state law.12 In order to determine the tax consequences of
these transaction forms, the IRS generally uses the “assets-up,” “assetsover,” and “interests-over” constructs. The details of how these constructs
apply to partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations are set forth
in Treasury Regulation § 1.708-1(c), Treasury Regulation § 1.708-1(d),13
and Revenue Ruling 84-111,14 respectively, and are discussed below.15

12. For example, in order to merge, the merged partnership and the surviving
partnership can undertake a statutory merger. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §15-902
(2007) (providing for the statutory merger of two partnerships). Alternatively, the
partnerships could undertake various transfers that have the effect of combining the
businesses of two partnerships. For example, (a) the merged partnership can transfer its
assets to the surviving partnership in exchange for interests in the surviving partnership
and then liquidate; (b) the merged partnership can transfer its assets up to its partners and
then the partners can contribute the assets to the surviving partnership in exchange for
interests in the surviving partnership; (c) the partners in the merged partnership can transfer all
of their interests in the merged partnership to the surviving partnership; or (d) some
combination of the foregoing can be undertaken, such as transferring some assets directly
from the merged partnership to the surviving partnership and transferring some assets up
to the partners of the merged partnership.
13. The current versions of Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c) and -1(d) were proposed in
2000 by Partnership Mergers and Divisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 1572 (proposed Jan. 11, 2000),
and finalized in 2001 by T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496. For ease of discussion, the
regulations proposed in the 2000 Federal Register will often be referred to as the
“Proposed Section 708 Regulations,” the regulations finalized in the 2001 Treasury
Decision will often be referred to as the “Final Section 708 Regulations,” and reference
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A. Partnership Mergers16
1. General Rules
In applying the various constructs to a partnership merger, the Code
and regulations first determine whether the combined partnership (the
“resulting partnership”) is a continuation of either of the merging

to the “Section 708 Regulations” will denote the Proposed Section 708 Regulations and
Final Section 708 Regulations together.
Prior to the promulgation of the Section 708 Regulations, partnership mergers were
generally analyzed under the assets-over construct. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-289, 1968-1
C.B. 314. However, the Service did not employ a consistent approach to partnership
divisions prior to the promulgation of Section 708 Regulations. The IRS respected the
assets-up approach taken in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-45-069 (Aug. 17, 1989), respected
the assets-over approach taken in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 94-37-007 (June 10, 1994), and
recast an attempted assets-over transaction as an assets-up division in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-50-035 (Sept. 22, 1993), in each case without articulating a clear rationale for the
choice of construct.
14. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88. Before Revenue Ruling 84-111, Revenue
Ruling 70-239 provided that all forms of incorporations were treated pursuant to the
assets-over construct. Rev. Rul. 70-239, 1970-1 C.B. 74.
15. This Article assumes that the Section 707 regulations regarding disguised sales
do not change the analysis set forth herein for mergers and divisions and assumes that
the final regulations regarding disguised sales will coordinate with the application of the
Final Section 708 Regulations. See generally Richard M. Lipton, Controversial Prop.
Regs. on Disguised Sales of Partnership Interests—IRS Jumps into the Deep End, 102 J.
TAX’N 71, 76 & n.28 (2005) (discussing the possibility of interaction between the
regulations regarding partnership mergers and divisions and the proposed regulations
regarding disguised sales).
16. Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations actually defines whether a
transaction constitutes a merger of partnerships. I.R.C. § 708(b)(2)(A) (2000); Treas.
Reg. § 1.708-1(c) (as amended in 2002). In connection with the promulgation of the
Final Section 708 Regulations, the IRS considered including, but explicitly decided not
to provide, a definition of the term “merger.” T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496. However,
the IRS has generally treated the combination of two or more partnerships (or the
businesses of such partnerships) into a single partnership as a merger for purposes of
Section 708, regardless of the form or state law nomenclature for the transaction. See,
e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-39-031 (June 24, 2003) (applying the partnership merger
rules to the consolidation of six partnerships into a single LLC); 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET
AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 12.06[1] n.199 (3d ed. 2004)
(collecting examples of transactions that the IRS treated as mergers prior to the
promulgation of the Final Section 708 Regulations). This Article adopts this approach,
treating the amalgamation of multiple partnerships as a merger for purposes of Section
708. Further, although a merger can involve many partnerships, for simplicity all
partnership mergers discussed in this Article are assumed to be mergers of only two
partnerships, unless otherwise stated. As an aside, the failure of the IRS to provide a
definition has raised the ire of some commentators, who argue that this omission results
in an unfair and unnecessary uncertainty. See, e.g., Barksdale Hortenstine et al., Final
Partnership Merger and Division Regulations—Analysis, Commentary and Examples, in
TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES &
OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2006, at 293, 306–07 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning,
Course Handbook Series No. 702, 2006), available at WL 702 PLI/Tax 293.
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partnerships.17 The answer to this question depends on the substance of
the transaction; the Code and regulations look specifically at the ownership
or asset composition of the resulting partnership without regard to which
entity is formally the surviving partnership under state law. The resulting
partnership is considered a continuation of a merging partnership if the
partners of that merging partnership own “more than 50 percent of the
capital and profits of the resulting partnership.”18 If the partners of more
than one of the merging partnerships own more than 50% of the capital
and profits of the resulting partnership,19 then the resulting partnership is
“considered [a] continuation solely of that partnership which is credited
with the contribution of assets having the greatest fair market value (net of
liabilities) to the resulting partnership.”20
Once it has been determined which merging partnership is treated as
continuing and which merging partnership is treated as terminated,21 the
partnership merger constructs are applied. The Treasury regulations’
two basic constructs for partnership mergers are assets-up and assetsover. Under the assets-up construct, the terminated partnership is treated
as distributing its assets up to its partners in liquidation, and then the
partners of the terminated partnership are treated as contributing the
distributed assets to the resulting partnership in exchange for interests in
the resulting partnership.22 Under the assets-over construct, the terminated
partnership is treated as contributing its assets and liabilities over to the
resulting partnership in exchange for interests in the resulting partnership,
and then the terminated partnership is treated as making a liquidating
distribution to its partners of the interests in the resulting partnership.23
The interests-over construct, in which the partners in the terminated
partnership contribute all of their interests in the terminated partnership
over to the resulting partnership in exchange for interests in the resulting

17. I.R.C. § 708(b)(2)(A) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2002).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2002).
19. This could occur, for example, if some partners own interests in both merging
partnerships.
20. § 1.708-1(c)(1). If members of no merging partnership own more than 50% of
the capital and profits of the resulting partnership, the resulting partnership is treated as a
new partnership and not as a continuation of any prior partnership. Id.
21. Any partnership that is not treated as “continuing” is considered to be terminated.
Id.
22. Id. § 1.708-1(c)(3)(ii).
23. Id. § 1.708-1(c)(3)(i).
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partnership, is not respected under the Treasury regulations.24 Note that
all three constructs lead to the same substantive result:
Before & After
(regardless of construct)

Mechanics of Merger Constructs

A Partners
(1)
Assets

Partners of A

Partners of B

P’shp A
(terminated)

P’shp B
(continuing)

B Partners
(2) Assets for
P’shp B interests

P’shp A

P’shp B

Assets-Up Construct

Before
A Partners
(2)
P’shp B
Interests

P’shp A

Partners of A

Partnership AB

After

(1) Assets
for P’shp B
interests

P’shp B

Assets-Over Construct

Partners of B

(with all assets of P’shps A & B)

B Partners

A Partners
(1) P’shp A interests
for P’shp B interests

P’shp A

Interests-Over Construct

B Partners

P’shp B
(2)

24. Id. § 1.708-1(c)(4). If the interests-over construct was respected, the partners
of the terminated partnership would be treated for tax purposes as transferring interests
in the terminated partnership to the resulting partnership, and the resulting partnership
would be treated as receiving assets. Partnership Mergers and Divisions, 65 Fed. Reg.
1572 (proposed Jan. 11, 2000); Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88; McCauslen v.
Comm’r, 45 T.C. 588 (1966); see infra note 51.
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The Treasury regulations also provide for a variation on the assetsover approach to address the situation where some partners want to sell
all or part of their interests. Under the “buyout” rule, a partner in the
terminated partnership can sell its interest in the terminated partnership
to the continuing partnership immediately before the assets-over
transaction.25 Subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions, the Service
will respect this transfer as a sale of interests governed by Section 741 of
the Code.26
All of these rules and constructs operate against the backdrop of an
anti-abuse rule. Pursuant to the anti-abuse rule, if a merger is part of a
larger series of transactions, the Service can disregard the form of the
merger altogether and “recast the larger series of transactions in
accordance with their substance.”27
2. Application of the Assets-Up Construct
The assets-up construct generally adheres to form, in that it only
applies if the terminated partnership actually transfers its assets up to the
partners “in a manner that causes the partners to be treated, under the
laws of the applicable jurisdiction, as the owners of such assets.”28 The
preamble to the Final Section 708 Regulations explains that, in order to
accomplish this transfer, it is insufficient for partners merely to “assign
their rights to receive title to the assets in liquidation of the partnership,
or direct the partnership to transfer title to the assets to the resulting
partnership.”29 Further, although the preamble states that “[f]or most
types of assets, this [transfer of assets] will not require the actual transfer
and recording of a deed or certificate of title,”30 it is clear that the
transfer of title and recording of a deed will, in fact, be required in order
to transfer certain assets.
Notwithstanding the regulations’ general adherence to form and applicable
local law, the assets-up construct contains fictional elements as well.
For example, the preamble to the Final Section 708 Regulations and the
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(4) (as amended in 2002).
26. Id. § 1.708-1(c)(4), -1(c)(5) (ex. 5). Although the merger regulations do not
respect the interests-over construct, the buyout rule is an “interests-over”-type transaction
in that the transfer is respected as a transfer of interests.
27. Id. § 1.708-1(c)(6).
28. Id. § 1.708-1(c)(3)(ii).
29. T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496, 497.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
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regulations themselves indicate that the transfer of an asset to the partners
will be respected even if the partners generally could not own the asset
outside the partnership.31 Further, despite the requirement that the terminated
partnership actually transfer the assets to the partners, the partners are
not actually required to assume the liabilities of the partnership in order for
the assets-up form to be respected.32
3. Application of the Assets-Over Construct
Any partnership merger that is not structured in a way that qualifies
for assets-up treatment will be treated as an assets-over transaction.33
Hence, the assets-over construct will apply not only to transactions
actually taken in an assets-over form, but also to any formless partnership
merger that occurs under a state statute, any partnership merger that is
effectuated in an interests-over form, and any partnership merger that
otherwise fails to qualify as an assets-up transaction.
Because the assets-over construct applies to such a wide variety of
transactions, many of which do not involve the transfer of assets at all,
the transfers that are deemed to occur in a partnership merger may be
entirely fictional and markedly different from the transfers that actually
occur. This possible fictional result is magnified because, as discussed
above in Part II.A.1, the partnership that is treated as continuing for tax
purposes, and thus treated as receiving the transferred assets, may cease
to exist for state law purposes.

31. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(5) (ex. 3) (as amended in 2002). To illustrate this
point, the Service cites goodwill (and specifically, the undivided interest in business
goodwill that a partner might receive as part of an assets-up transaction) as the type of
asset that might raise this problem. § 1.708-1(c)(5) (ex. 3); T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496.
32. T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496; see infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text
(discussing the Service’s explanation for this treatment of liabilities).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(3)(i) (as amended in 2002).
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B. Partnership Divisions34
1. General Rules
The tax treatment of partnership divisions is quite similar to the tax
treatment of partnership mergers. In order to understand how the
various constructs apply to a partnership division, one must first
determine whether any of the post-division local law partnerships (the
“resulting partnerships”) are a continuation of the pre-division local law
partnership (the “prior partnership”), and, if so, which continuing
partnership (if any) is treated as being divided for tax purposes (the
“divided partnership”).35 As with partnership mergers, the Code and
regulations look to the substance of the division in order to answer these
questions. A resulting partnership is considered a continuation of the prior
partnership “[i]f the members of the resulting partnership or partnerships
had an interest of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the
prior partnership.”36 If there is only one continuing partnership, that

34. As with mergers, the IRS considered including a definition of partnership
“division” in the Final Section 708 Regulations but ultimately provided little guidance.
T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496; see also supra note 16. However, the Service did explain
that “[t]o have a division, at least two members of the prior partnership must be members
of each resulting partnership that exists after the transaction.” T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B.
496, 499; Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(d)(4)(iv) (as amended in 2002). In the absence of a full
definition of the term “division,” the IRS has generally treated the separation of one
partnership into two or more partnerships (each of which has at least two members that
were members of the prior partnership) as a division for purposes of Section 708,
regardless of the form or state law nomenclature for the transaction. See, e.g., I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-045 (Mar. 3, 2002) (applying the partnership division rules to the
separation of a single LLC into two LLCs). This Article adopts this approach. Further,
although a division can involve the separation of one partnership into many partnerships,
for simplicity, all partnership divisions discussed in this Article are assumed to be
divisions of one partnership into only two partnerships, unless otherwise stated.
35. I.R.S. § 708(b)(2)(B) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2002).
The regulations employ very specific terminology in describing the tax consequences of
divisions. The “prior partnership” and the “resulting partnerships” both refer to partnerships
actually existing under local law; the “prior partnership” is the partnership that exists
under local law before the division, and the “resulting partnerships” are the partnerships
that exist under local law after the division. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(d)(4)(ii), (iv) (as amended
in 2002). The “divided partnership” and the “recipient partnership” are tax fictions used
for purposes of determining the tax consequences of the division. The “divided partnership”
is the partnership that is treated for tax purposes as transferring assets and liabilities to
the recipient partnership in the division, while the “recipient partnership” is the
partnership that is treated for tax purposes as receiving assets and liabilities from the
divided partnership in the division. Id. § 1.708-1(d)(4)(i), (iii).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(d)(1).
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partnership is treated as the divided partnership. If there is more than
one continuing partnership, the regulations have a series of “tiebreak”
rules for determining which continuing partnership will be the divided
partnership.37 These rules apply regardless of whether the continuing or
divided partnerships existed under state law prior to the division.
Once the divided partnership, if any, has been identified, the partnership
division constructs are applied. As with partnership mergers, the Treasury
Regulations provide two basic constructs for analyzing partnership
divisions—the assets-up construct and the assets-over construct; there is
no interests-over formulation for partnership divisions. Under the assets-up
construct, the divided partnership is treated as distributing certain assets
to some or all of its partners in partial or complete liquidation of their
interests, and then the partners are treated as contributing all of the
distributed assets into the new recipient partnership in exchange for
interests in the new recipient partnership.38 Under the assets-over construct,
the divided partnership is treated as contributing certain assets to the
recipient partnership in exchange for interests in the recipient partnership,
and then the divided partnership is treated as distributing the interests in
the recipient partnership to some or all of the divided partnership’s partners
in partial or complete liquidation.39 Note that both the assets-up and the
assets-over constructs lead to the same substantive result:

37. Id. § 1.708-1(d)(4)(i). If there are multiple continuing partnerships, the tiebreak
rules provide that if one of the continuing partnerships actually transferred assets and
liabilities in the division, that continuing partnership is the divided partnership.
Otherwise, the continuing partnership with assets having the greatest net fair market
value is treated as the divided partnership. Id.
38. Id. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(ii)(A). If none of the resulting partnerships are continuations of
the prior partnerships (and hence there is no divided partnership), then the assets-up
construct works basically the same way, except that it is the prior partnership (and not
the divided partnership, since there is none) that will be treated as distributing assets, and
the partners will be treated as contributing the distributed assets into resulting
partnerships (if there is no divided partnership, there can be no recipient partnership).
39. Id. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(i)(A). If none of the resulting partnerships are continuations of
the prior partnerships, then the assets-over construct works in a similar manner, except
that the prior partnership will be treated as contributing all of its assets to the resulting
partnerships in exchange for interests in the resulting partnerships. Then the prior
partnership will be treated as liquidating and distributing the interests in the resulting
partnerships to the prior partnership’s partners. Id. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(i)(B).

270

FIELD.DOC

8/16/2007 10:22:29 AM

Fiction, Form, and Substance

[VOL. 44: 259, 2007]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Before & After
(regardless of construct)

C Partners

D Partners

Mechanics of Division Constructs

C Partners

D Partners
(2) D P’shp
interests

P’shp CD

Partnership CD

(1) D Assets
for D P’shp
interests

P’shp D

(prior p’shp)

Assets-Over Construct

Before
C Partners
C Partners

D Partners

D Partners
(1)
D assets

(2) D assets
for D P’shp
interests

P’shp D

P’shp D

P’shp C

(recipient)

(divided – formerly CD)

After

P’shp CD

Assets-Up Construct

Like the partnership merger rules, the partnership division regulations
include an anti-abuse rule. The anti-abuse rule provides that, if the division
is part of a larger series of transactions, the Service can disregard the
form of the division “and recast the larger series of transactions in
accordance with their substance.”40
2. Application of the Assets-Up Construct
As in partnership mergers, the assets-up construct as applied to
partnership divisions largely respects form; the assets-up construct will
only apply if the assets are actually transferred up to the partners.41 Such
40.
41.

Id. § 1.708-1(d)(6).
Id. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(ii).
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transfers are subject to the same limitations and requirements as discussed
in connection with the assets-up construct for partnership mergers.42
Moreover, in order for the assets-up form to be respected, all assets that
are ultimately transferred to the recipient partnership must be distributed
by the divided partnership to, and then contributed to the recipient
partnership by, the partners of the recipient partnership.43
3. Application of the Assets-Over Construct
As in partnership mergers, the assets-over construct applies not only to
division transactions actually taken in the assets-over form, but also to
all partnership divisions that do not qualify for assets-up treatment. This
includes formless divisions,44 divisions where only some of the assets of
the recipient partnership are transferred through the assets-up form,45
divisions where the prior partnership contributes certain assets into an
LLC and then distributes the interests in the LLC to the prior partnership’s
partners,46 and any other divisions that do not comply with the assets-up
requirements.
As with partnership mergers, tax analysis of a division may follow its
form, but often results in the application of legal fictions. For instance,
the assets-over construct applies to a wide variety of transactions, many
of which do not involve the transfer of assets at all. Likewise,
continuing and divided partnerships may not even exist as state law
entities prior to the division. Thus, the transfers that are deemed to
occur in a division under the Final Section 708 Regulations47 may be
entirely fictional and markedly different from the actual transfers that
occur.

42. See supra Part II.A.2.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2002). Similarly, if there is
no divided partnership, the prior partnership must transfer all of its assets to the resulting
partnerships and then liquidate; if the prior partnership does not liquidate under the
applicable jurisdictional law, then the assets that are not transferred in this assets-up form
will be treated as transferred in an assets-over transaction. Id. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(ii)(B).
44. See, e.g., id. § 1.708-1(d)(5) (ex. 5).
45. See, e.g., id. § 1.708-1(d)(5) (ex. 3).
46. This may appear close to an assets-up form given that the transfer of all of the
interests in a single member LLC is generally viewed as transferring the underlying
assets for federal income tax purposes, because an owner of a single member LLC is
generally treated as owning the assets of the LLC for federal income tax purposes.
Treas. Reg. § 301.77-1-3(b). However, the partners receiving the distribution do not
actually become owners of the underlying assets under local law, since local law
generally respects LLCs as real entities. Hence, the transfer does not qualify for assetsup treatment and the assets-over default rule applies.
47. See supra note 13.
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C. Partnership Incorporations
1. General Rules
In contrast to the IRS’s approach to partnership mergers and divisions,
the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 84-111, ruled that it will respect each of
three different forms for incorporating a partnership: assets-up, assetsover, and interests-over.48 Under the assets-up construct, the partnership
is treated as distributing all of its assets and liabilities up to its partners
in liquidation, and then the partners are treated as contributing all of the
distributed assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange for all of
the stock of the corporation and the new corporation’s assumption of all
of the partnership’s liabilities that had been assumed by the partners.49
Under the assets-over construct, the partnership is treated as transferring
all of its assets and liabilities over to a newly formed corporation in
exchange for all of the stock in the corporation and then distributing the
stock to the partnership’s partners in liquidation.50 Under the interestsover construct, the partners of the partnership are treated as transferring
all of their partnership interests over to a newly formed corporation in
exchange for all of the stock in the newly formed corporation, and the
newly formed corporation is treated as receiving all of the assets and
liabilities of the partnership.51
The Service recently addressed the treatment of “formless” incorporations
(that is, a conversion of a partnership to a corporation under a state law
statute that does not require an actual transfer of assets or interests), and
the Service concluded that Revenue Ruling 84-111 does not apply to
formless incorporations.52 Instead, a partnership that undertakes a
formless incorporation will be treated as if it had elected under the
“check-the-box” regulations to be treated as an association taxable as a
48. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Note that the interests-over construct produces asymmetrical treatment for
the partners and the corporation. The partners are treated as transferring interests, but the
corporation is treated as receiving assets. In the general counsel memorandum
supporting Revenue Ruling 84-111, the IRS cited McCauslen v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 588
(1966) and Rev. Rul. 67-65, 1967-1 C.B. 168, for the proposition that “although the
partners are transferring their partnership interests, for purposes of determining tax
consequences to [the new corporation, the new corporation] is viewed as receiving not
interests in an ongoing partnership, but rather as receiving the partnership assets.” Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37,540 (May 18, 1978).
52. Rev. Rul. 2004-59, 2004-21 C.B. 1050.
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corporation.53 That is, the formless incorporation will be treated as an
assets-over incorporation.54
Again, note that all of the forgoing approaches to incorporations lead
to the same substantive result:
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53. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, -3 (as amended in 2006). The check-the-box
regulations govern the tax classification of business entities. They provide default rules
for the tax classification of business entities as disregarded entities, partnerships, and
associations taxable as a corporations. With some exceptions for entities that are “per
se” corporations, the regulations generally allow business entities to elect their tax
classification by filing a form and checking a box, hence the check-the-box moniker.
See infra Parts IV.A.2.c and IV.B for discussions of the check-the-box rules and how
they coordinate and should coordinate with the rules regarding partnership mergers,
divisions and incorporations.
54. When a partnership elects to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax
purposes, the check-the-box regulations provide that the assets-over construct applies to
the conversion. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 2006).
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2. Application of the Assets-Up, Assets-Over and
Interests-Over Constructs
Under Revenue Ruling 84-111, the application of the different constructs
generally adheres to the form of partnership incorporations. For instance,
the assets-up construct appears to require the actual distribution of all of
the partnership’s assets and liabilities up to the partnership’s partners,
followed by an actual transfer of those assets to the new corporation in
exchange for all of the stock in the corporation.55 Note that the assets-up
requirements in partnership incorporations are slightly different from
mergers and divisions in that (a) Revenue Ruling 84-111 requires an
actual distribution of assets but does not explicitly rely on local law like
the partnership merger and division regulations do, and (b) Revenue
Ruling 84-111 seems to require that the partners actually assume the
partnership’s liabilities in addition to receiving the partnership’s assets,
whereas the partnership merger and division regulations do not require
liability assumption. Like the assets-up construct, application of the interestsover construct to partnership incorporation is also based on the actual
form of the transaction. In contrast, the assets-over construct applies
not only to incorporations actually undertaken in an assets-over form,
but also applies, as a fiction, to formless incorporations.
D. Tax Consequences of the Different Constructs
The tax consequences to partners and entities in partnership mergers,
divisions, and incorporations can vary widely based on whether an assetsup, assets-over, or, where applicable, interests-over construct is applied.
The IRS, in promulgating the guidance regarding the tax treatment of
these transactions, has explicitly acknowledged these differences.56
55. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-13-051
(Apr. 4, 1986) (applying the assets-up construct where the partnership liquidated and
distributed its assets and liabilities to the partners). But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-21018 (Feb. 23, 1994) (applying the assets-up construct where the assets are
“constructively distributed” and the partners “direct the transfer of assets” to the
corporation).
56. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88 states:
The premise in Rev. Rul. 70-239 that the federal income tax consequences of
the three situations described therein [assets-over, assets-up, and interestsover] would be the same, without regard to which of the three transactions was
entered into, is incorrect. As described below, depending on the format chosen
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Particularly since the promulgation of the Proposed Section 708 Regulations57
regarding the various constructs for partnership mergers and divisions,
considerable attention has been focused on the tax consequences of the
different constructs, and other commentators have ably provided technical
analyses of these disparate tax consequences in the context of mergers and
divisions,58 as well as incorporations.59 Although this Article does not intend
to retread this well-traveled path, it is useful to summarize the key
potential differences between the constructs.
Depending on the form of merger or division, a resulting partnership’s
basis and holding period in its assets and a partner’s basis and holding
period in its interest in the resulting partnership can vary.60 The form of
a merger or division can also affect the likelihood and extent of gain
for the transfer to a controlled corporation, the basis and holding periods of the
various assets received by the corporation and the basis and holding periods of
the stock received by the former partners can vary.
Id. at 89; see also Partnership Mergers and Divisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 1572, 1573–75
(proposed Jan. 11, 2000) (“Like partnership incorporations, each form of a partnership
merger has potentially different tax consequences. . . . As with partnership mergers, the
IRS and Treasury recognize that different tax consequences can arise depending on the
form of the partnership division.”).
57. See supra note 13.
58. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 16, at ¶ 12.06; 2 ARTHUR B. WILLIS ET AL.,
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION ¶ 16.03 (3d stud. ed. 2000); Eric B. Sloan et al., Partnership
Mergers and Divisions: A User’s Guide, in TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2006, at 421,
460–96 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series No. 702, 2006),
available at WL 702 PLI/Tax 421; Barbara Spudis de Marigny, Mergers & Divisions of
Partnerships, in TAX PLANNING, supra, at 531, 540–44, 545–46, 552–58, available at
WL 702 PLI/Tax 531; Barksdale Hortenstine et al., Final Partnership Merger and
Division Regulation—Analysis, Commentary and Examples, in TAX PLANNING, supra, at
293, 309–14, 364–69, available at WL 702 PLI/Tax 293; Susan Kalinka, Proposed Regulations
Concerning Partnership Mergers and Divisions Provide Guidance and Some, But Not
Enough, Flexibility, 78 TAXES 15 (2000).
59. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 16, at ¶ 17.03; WILLIS ET AL., supra note
58, at ¶ 12.05; Banoff, supra note 3; Cheryl Metrejean & Clair Y. Nash, Tax
Consequences of a Formless Conversion Following Rev. Rul. 2004-59, 83 TAXES 43
(2005).
60. For example, in an assets-over merger, the terminated partnership’s basis in the
assets carries over to the resulting partnership pursuant to Section 723, whereas in an
assets-up merger, the basis in the assets is stepped up or down to the partners’ outside
basis in their partnership interests pursuant to Section 732(b), and this stepped up or
down basis carries over to the resulting partnership. Although this difference can be
ameliorated if the resulting partnership makes an election under Section 754, not all
partnerships will have a Section 754 election in effect, and even if such election is in
effect, the allocation of the basis step-up may be different in the assets-over and assetsup scenarios. See de Marigny, supra note 58, at 539–43; see also Glen E. Goold &
Steven R. Schneider, Finding the Gold Nuggets in Partnership Holding Periods, 81
TAXES 47 (2003) (discussing the effect of incorporations, partnership mergers and
partnership divisions on holding periods); Eric B. Sloan et al., Partnership Mergers and
Divisions: A User’s Guide, in TAX PLANNING, supra note 58, at 461–64 (discussing the
basis consequences of different partnership division constructs).
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recognition, including gain recognition resulting from the shifting of
liabilities,61 and gain recognition with respect to appreciated properties
pursuant to Section 704(c) and Section 737.62
Similarly, as noted by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 84-111, depending
on the construct for incorporation, “the basis and holding periods of the
various assets received by the corporation and the basis and holding
periods of the stock received by the former partners can vary.”63 In
addition, the form of incorporation can disparately affect other tax
consequences as well, such as the occurrence and extent of gain
recognition by the former partners upon incorporation (including
pursuant to Sections 704(c) and 737),64 the character of any such gain
recognized,65 the ability of the new corporation to elect to be taxed as an

61. If a partner’s share of partnership liabilities is treated as decreasing in a merger
or division, the partner is treated as receiving a deemed distribution under Section 752,
which could result in gain recognition by the partner pursuant to Section 731. Prior to
the Section 708 Regulations, the risk of gain recognition was particularly acute in the
context of assets-over mergers because the terminated partnership could be treated as if it
received a deemed distribution in the first step of the assets-over transaction, and the
consequences of that gain recognition would flow through to the partners of the
terminated partnership. In order to address this risk, the Section 708 Regulations
incorporate a “netting” concept for purposes of determining whether a partner has a
decrease in its share of partnership liabilities as a result of a merger. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1(f) (as amended in 2005); Partnership Mergers and Divisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. 1572 (proposed Jan. 11, 2000). However, the language of this netting rule technically
only applies to mergers, so the application of the netting concept in partnership divisions
is less clear.
62. The application of Section 704(c) and Section 737 to partnership mergers and
divisions has been the subject of much discussion. In the preambles to both the Proposed
Section 708 Regulations and Final Section 708 Regulations, the Service flagged Section
704(c) and Section 737 as areas for study and future guidance. Partnership Mergers and
Divisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 1572, 1576 (proposed Jan. 11, 2000); T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B.
496. Rev. Rul. 2004-43, 2004-1 C.B. 842 was intended to provide published guidance
regarding the application of these provisions to an assets-over partnership merger, but it
was revoked by Rev. Rul. 2005-10, 2005-7 I.R.B 492 under heavy criticism. The
Service’s 2006–2007 Priority Guidance Plan includes the promulgation of regulations
under Sections 704(c) and 737 regarding partnership mergers. Eric Solomon et al.,
Department of the Treasury First Periodic Update of the 2006-2007 Priority Guidance
Plan (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006-2007pgp.pdf.
63. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88, 89; see also Goold & Schneider, supra note 60.
64. See, e.g., WILLIS ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶ 12.05 (indicating that the gain
recognition upon the transfer and the characterization of the gain can vary depending on
the method of incorporation), ¶ 13.02[1][a][v] (discussing the application of Section 737
to incorporations).
65. Id. at ¶ 12.05.
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S corporation,66 and the availability of an ordinary loss deduction under
Section 1244 if the stock of the corporation becomes worthless.67
None of the constructs is certain to produce the most tax favorable
result for the taxpayer. Although the Service has indicated that it believes
the assets-over construct will generally be preferable for taxpayers and
the IRS,68 the tax consequences of applying a particular construct to a
transaction may be more or less favorable depending on the specific
facts and circumstances of the taxpayer’s situation.
III. INHABITING THE NO MAN’S LAND BETWEEN FORM AND FICTION
A. The Problems of Disparate Tax Treatment of Substantively
Equivalent Transactions
As illustrated above, various forms can be used to accomplish the
same economic transaction (turning two partnerships into one, one
partnership into two, or a partnership into a corporation), but the tax
consequences can vary depending on the construct used to analyze the
transaction. Since a taxpayer may prefer the federal income tax results
of one construct over the results of another, a taxpayer may try to
structure a transaction in a particular form in order to achieve the
preferred tax results.
However, the federal income tax consequence of a transaction is likely
to be only one factor in the determination of what form to adopt for a
given transaction. Numerous non-tax business factors are also likely to
be relevant to the choice of form.69 For example, a partnership’s bank
credit agreements or debt covenants may limit or preclude the partnership
from actually transferring assets, and thus may militate in favor of an
interests-over form or a formless structure for a transaction. Similarly,
the assets-over and assets-up forms may be difficult to undertake if the
partnership’s contracts cannot be transferred without consent, if the
actual transfer of assets would require complicated administrative filings, or
if there are regulatory restrictions on the ability of the partnership to
transfer assets, as there often are with permits and licenses. Formless

66. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (2005).
67. See, e.g., WILLIS ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶ 12.05 (discussing various tax
consequences of different methods of incorporation). See generally Rev. Rul. 84-111,
1984-2 C.B. 88 (mentioning several of these issues as potential adverse tax consequences
to the assets-over construct).
68. See, e.g., Partnership Mergers and Divisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 1572 (proposed Jan.
11, 2000).
69. Certain other tax issues not discussed herein, such as the transfer taxes under
local law, may also be relevant.
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transactions may be the simplest from the perspective of administrative
and transaction costs.
On the other hand, limiting liability may be an overarching business
concern. For example, if a resulting partnership in a merger wants to limit
its exposure to undisclosed or contingent liabilities of the terminated
partnership, the resulting partnership may prefer to receive the terminated
partnership’s business in an actual asset transfer (in either an assets-up
or assets-over form), rather than in an interests-over transaction (in
which the resulting partnership would actually end up owning the state
law entity of the terminated partnership). The assets-up form may be
particularly disadvantageous if there is a significant risk that the transferee
will succeed to the liabilities associated with the asset (like environmental
remediation responsibility, which can transfer to a subsequent owner
along with the transfer of real estate);70 individual partners are likely
loathe to take on the exposure to such liabilities.
Moreover, partnership agreements often impose limitations on the
ability of the partnership to undertake certain transactions, including
liquidation, merger, division, incorporation, and the transfer of all or
substantially all of the assets of the partnership.71 These limitations may
make it easier or harder for the partnership to undertake transactions in
certain forms depending on the specific restrictions contained in the
partnership agreement. For example, the assets-up and interests-over
forms of transactions require the participation of all partners by their
very form, whereas a partnership agreement may provide that a
partnership can merge or transfer its assets with an affirmative vote from
only a majority of the partners, but without unanimous consent. In that
case, if there are dissenting partners, the partnership may be able to
undertake a state law merger or an assets-over form of transaction but
not an assets-up or interests-over form of transaction.

70. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Parent or Successor
Corporation, or Corporate Shareholders in Action Pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 121 A.L.R. FED. 173 (1994)
(discussing a successor entity’s responsibilities for environmental liabilities of its
predecessor, in the context of the acquisition of assets).
71. For example, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), Uniform Partnership
Act (UPA), and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) each allow a
merger to be approved by less than all of the partners if the operating agreement of the
entity so provides. See, e.g., UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1110(a) (2001);
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 905(c)(1) (1997); UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
ACT § 904(c)(1) (1996).
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If business factors support the use of a form that also produces the
desired tax results for the partners and partnerships, then the choice of
structure is easy. However, if the form of transaction that is most
desirable from a business perspective results in unfavorable tax
consequences to the partners and partnerships, the parties will likely
weigh the costs and benefits of each form and employ the one that
produces the best result on a net basis, taking both business and tax
considerations into account. Thus, although they are not the sole
consideration, the tax consequences of a transaction may influence the
manner in which the transaction is undertaken. This is not an unusual
result; it is well accepted that the imposition of tax affects taxpayer
choices.72 However, to the extent possible, such taxes should be
imposed and such influence should be exerted in a manner consistent
with various tax policy objectives such as neutrality, fairness and
efficiency, among others.
As used herein, neutrality refers to the goal of minimizing the effect of
the tax law on a taxpayer’s choice of whether and how to undertake a
transaction; that is, neutrality reflects the desire for tax law to be
unbiased across taxpayer economic decisions.73 The application of this
neutrality principle in the situation where the transactions or decisions
are substantively equivalent has been called “functional neutrality.”
72. See generally, e.g., 1 BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 3.2.1 (3d ed. 1999) (“Imposing a new tax or
increasing an existing tax changes the prior relationship between the cost of engaging in
the taxed activities and the rewards accruing to them.”); Douglas A. Kahn, Comments on
“Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capital and Debt,” 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1081, 1081
(1984) (“It is worth noting that the establishment of an income tax system necessarily
introduces a bias that affects market behavior. That is not a happy consequence, but it is
inevitable.”); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devise for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705
(1970). Even the government acknowledges the impact of taxes on taxpayer behavior.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE:
BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, & QUESTIONS 38 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d051009sp.pdf (“Generally, taxes alter or distort decisions about how to use
resources, creating economic inefficiencies.”).
73. See Harold M. Groves, Neutrality in Taxation, 1 NAT'L TAX J. 18 (1948);
David W. LaRue, A Case for Neutrality in the Design and Implementation of the Merger
and Acquisition Statutes: The Post-Acquisition Net Operating Loss Carryback
Limitations, 43 TAX. L. REV. 85 (1987); Kahn, supra note 72, at 1081; William D.
Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capital and Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1057
(1984) (discussing the elimination of bias); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
UNDERSTANDING TAX REFORM: A GUIDE TO 21ST CENTURY ALTERNATIVES xi (2005),
available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/tax/AICPA_Understanding_Tax_Reform.pdf
(defining neutrality as the principle that “[t]he effect of the tax law on a taxpayer's
decisions as to how to carry out a particular transaction or whether to engage in a
transaction should be kept to a minimum.”); Inst. for Policy Innovation, A Framework
for Tax Reform, 107 TAX NOTES 915, 917 (2005) (“An economically neutral tax is
unbiased across economic activities.”).
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“Functional neutrality . . . calls for impartiality in the tax recognition and
treatment of acquisitions which are functional equivalents of one
another.”74 Accordingly, if the tax law was functionally neutral in its
application to partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations, tax law
would not discriminate against any particular form of transaction or
influence a taxpayer to take one form of transaction over another.
However, as discussed above, taxpayers’ decisions about what form of
transaction to undertake are undoubtedly influenced by tax law because
different forms of transactions lead to the application of different tax
constructs and thus potentially different tax consequences. Moreover,
because the impact of this bias depends partly on the non-tax business
factors relevant to the choice of form, in practice, these tax rules
discriminate more harshly against taxpayers who, for non-tax reasons,
have greater difficulty in structuring their transactions to produce a
desired tax result.
The concern about neutrality relates to similar concerns about fairness
and efficiency. Fairness, or equity, suggests that “[s]imilarly situated
taxpayers should be taxed similarly,”75 but a party who undertakes one
74. LaRue, supra note 73, at 218; see also id. at 218 n.429 (“‘[F]unctional
neutrality’ has little, if anything, to do with the formulation of policy, and everything to
do with the design of rules intended to implement policy once formulated.”).
75. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 73, at xi; see also,
e.g., Inst. for Policy Innovation, supra note 73, at 918 (“‘Fairness’ means equal treatment
under the law, equal treatment for those equally situated, and no discrimination among
taxpayers unequally situated unless that discrimination is consistent with the purposes
and principles of a sound tax system.”); LaRue, supra note 73, at 216 n.427 (“‘Horizontal
equity,’ for example, requires that taxpayers of comparable economic circumstance bear
correspondingly comparable tax burdens. The complementary, and generally accepted,
notion of ‘vertical equity’ suggests not only that taxpayers of dissimilar economic
circumstance bear dissimilar relative tax burdens, but also that this relationship be direct,
rather than inverse.”). LaRue also cites Professor Groves’s article for purposes of
distinguishing neutrality from equity:
Professor Groves, perhaps one of the first commentators to explicitly isolate
and define this concept, and to distinguish it from “equity,” described neutrality in
the following terms:
Neutrality . . . calls for impartiality of treatment. The partiality that we
are concerned with may arise from: (1) unequal treatment of essentially
similar taxpayers; or (2) the same treatment of essentially different
taxpayers. Discrimination may be deliberate or inept. Its curse is removed
when it is supported by adequate public purpose and ample prospect for
achieving that purpose.
The term “neutrality” as thus defined differs from “equity” . . . which
include[s] an interest in economic equality as well as in impartiality.
Thus taxes are said to be equitable when they make for a more even
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form of partnership merger, division, or incorporation is likely to be
taxed differently than a party who undertakes a different form of
partnership merger, division, or incorporation, even though the different
forms are substantively equivalent. Because of the lack of neutrality and
equity, a rational taxpayer, after balancing the tax and non-tax factors
influencing the choice of form, may choose a form that is more costly
from a non-tax perspective solely to achieve more favorable tax results,76
thereby diverting funds from more productive uses and introducing
inefficiency.77 If the various transaction forms were not taxed differently,
such a rational taxpayer would have chosen the transaction form that
allowed it to use its limited funds optimally, thereby accomplishing the
transaction with fewer dollars, using the remaining dollars for more
beneficial uses, and making all parties better off.
B. Other Considerations as Possible Explanations
for Disparate Treatment
Admittedly, neutrality, fairness, and efficiency are not the only policy
goals of taxation, and they are sometimes sacrificed in order to
accomplish other policy objectives.78 However, deviation from these
basic goals should be supported by compelling justifications. This section
discusses various alternate considerations that might explain the lack of
neutrality, fairness, and efficiency in the tax rules regarding partnership
mergers, divisions, and incorporations. This section concludes that not
only do none of these considerations provide a satisfactory explanation
distribution of economic reward. Neutrality has to do less with the
standards applied to the over-all distribution of the tax load and more with
the even application of those standards once they are chosen. There is no
inference of conflict between the two canons. The thought is not that
taxes should be neutral rather than equitable; they should be both. Or
perhaps more accurately: taxes should be equitable and they should
deviate from neutrality only for adequate public purpose.
Id. at 218 n.429 (citing Groves, supra note 73, at 18).
76. This assumes that the added tax benefits of the chosen form outweigh the
additional non-tax costs of the chosen form. This is merely an example, and the reverse,
where the rational taxpayer agrees to bear additional tax cost in order to achieve non-tax
benefits, is equally plausible and problematic.
77. See generally, e.g., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note
73; Inst. for Policy Innovation, supra note 73; Chris Edwards, Options for Tax Reform,
106 TAX NOTES 1529 (2005); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72 (each
discussing efficiency as an important tax policy objective); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing efficiency,
among other economic principles, as applied to the legal system).
78. A very basic example of deviation from neutrality is the imposition of a tax on
income from personal services, which influences taxpayers’ choices between work and
leisure. However, we accept that influence because of the need to raise revenue, among
other reasons.
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for the disparate treatment, but furthermore, analysis of some of the
alternative considerations supports revising the tax rules applicable to
partnership merger, division, and incorporation transactions.
1. Adherence to Form79
Despite the prevalence of the “substance over form” doctrine,80
respect for form may still be a relevant consideration in the tax analysis
of transactions, even though respecting form may lead to differing tax
results for substantively equivalent transactions. This is particularly true
where, as in the case of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations,
looking to the substance of a transaction does not provide enough
information about the tax consequences because the substance of the
transaction can be accomplished through multiple, equally plausible,
alternatives. In such a case, form can serve as a “tiebreak” rule. In
addition, adhering to form can help ensure predictability of results, both
by providing security for taxpayers that they are getting the deal they
bargained for, and by preventing the government from getting whipsawed.81
However, adherence to form does not justify deviation from the
principles of neutrality, fairness, and equity in the tax treatment of
partnership mergers and divisions. In many partnership mergers and
divisions, the form employed by the taxpayer is not respected at all; it is

79. Formless transactions, by definition, lack form to respect, so the “adherence to
form” consideration cannot explain their tax analysis. Accordingly, formless transactions are
excluded from this discussion. Nevertheless, for formless transactions, some construct
must be adopted in order to analyze the tax consequences of the transaction. See infra
Part IV (proposing such a construct).
80. See, e.g., Estate of Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961)
(“The principle of looking through form to substance . . . is the cornerstone of sound
taxation . . . .”). See generally note 3 (collecting authorities).
81. See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 495–98 (discussing these and other explanations for
the continued role of form in Subchapter C). Further, in some situations, the Service has
asserted and the courts have ruled that the form chosen by taxpayers should be respected
for purposes of determining the tax consequences of transactions, and that taxpayers
should be obligated to accept the tax consequences of the form they have chosen. See,
e.g., Comm’r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858
(1967). This has been referred to as the “taxpayer non-disavowal principle,” defined as
“a fundamental notion that where the taxpayer, and not the government controls the
facts, the taxpayer should be restricted in its ability to assert that the substance and not
the form controls for tax purposes . . . .” Kenneth L. Harris, Should There Be a “Form
Consistency” Requirement? Danielson Revisited, 78 TAXES 88, 89 (2000); see also
William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer’s Ability to Disavow Form,
70 OR. L. REV. 381 (1991).
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totally ignored in favor of an assets-over fiction.82 Further, even where
form is purportedly followed for purposes of the tax analysis, as with an
assets-up transaction, the purported application of form is often at least
as much fiction as it is form. For example, when effectuating an assetsup form, the Service will respect a partnership’s transfer to the partners
of assets that the partners are precluded from owning under state law.83
Hence, in order to respect this “formal” transfer, the Final Section 708
Regulations84 suspend the state law reality. In addition, in respecting the
assets-up form without requiring that liabilities be assumed by the
partners, the Service is conceding the fiction created by Section 752.
“Pursuant to Section 752 . . . a partner essentially is deemed to have
directly incurred a share of the partnership’s liabilities.”85 If the Service
is willing to subscribe to that fiction for purposes of the “transfer” of
liabilities, query why the Service is not also willing to respect the assetsup form without requiring that assets actually be transferred to the
partners, on the basis of the “aggregate” theory of partnerships, whereby
partners are viewed as owning a direct interest in each partnership
asset.86 In addition, the distribution of assets to the partners in an assetsup transaction would likely be disregarded under the step transaction

82. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
83. For example, the preamble to the Final Section 708 Regulations and the
regulations themselves indicate that the transfer of an asset to the partners will be
respected even if the partners generally could not own the asset outside the partnership.
Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(5) (ex. 3) (as amended in 2002). To illustrate this point, the
Service cites goodwill (and specifically, the undivided interest in business goodwill that
a partner might receive as part of an assets-up transaction) as the type of asset that might
raise this problem. § 1.708-1(c)(5) (ex. 3); T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496.
84. See supra note 13.
85. T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496, 497 (emphasis added). To justify treating
liabilities differently than assets for purposes of qualifying for treatment under the assetsup construct, the Service also explains that requiring partners to assume the partnership
liabilities “could create a trap for the unwary” in that “[i]f a partner momentarily
assumes an amount of the partnership’s debt that is less than the partner’s share of such
debt under Section 752 . . . the partner could inappropriately recognize gain as a result of
the deemed distribution.” Id. at 497–98. However, the same could be said about
distribution of assets. If a partner momentarily receives more than its share of the
partnership assets, the partner could inappropriately recognize gain, just as if the partner
assumed less than its share of partnership debt. Accordingly, it seems curious that the
Service is concerned that partners are at greater risk for distributing liabilities incorrectly
than they are for distributing assets incorrectly. Perhaps that is a tacit admission about
the incredible complexity of the Section 752 regulations. I do not mean to advocate
requiring that partners assume the partnership liabilities in order to qualify for assets-up
treatment. Rather, I am suggesting that perhaps this explanation, justifying not requiring
partners to actually assume partnership liabilities in order for the assets-up construct to
apply, might also justify not requiring the partners to receive an actual local law transfer
of the assets.
86. See generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 16, at ¶ 1.02 (discussing aggregate
and entity concepts in partnership taxation).
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doctrine,87 and the Service admits that the partnership’s transfer of the
assets up to the partners is transitory; however, the Final Section 708
Regulations affirmatively state that the formal transfers will be respected
despite their transitory nature.88 Admitting that the transfers are transitory
acknowledges that they are empty forms, and respecting an empty form
is tantamount to respecting a fiction.
In the context of partnership incorporations other than formless
incorporations, the tax consequences are determined based on the actual
form of the transactions. This reliance on form is justified, in part, by
General Counsel Memorandum 37,540, which supports Revenue Ruling
84-111, and explains that the Service believed each of the forms of
transactions should qualify as tax-free exchanges under Section 351.89
In order to reach the conclusion that Section 351 applied in the assetsover form, the Service respected the interim step (the terminated
partnership’s contribution of assets in exchange for stock), even where
the partnership had a prearranged plan to transfer the stock of the
corporation that the partnership received in exchange for the
contribution of assets.90 The regard for form, which leads to disparate
87. An assets-up transaction is likely to occur pursuant to a set of prearranged
steps, memorialized in one set of transaction documents that obligates the partners to
contribute the assets immediately after receiving them in a distribution so that the
distribution will not occur without the contribution. This would likely satisfy the step
transaction doctrine, regardless of whether the “end result,” “binding commitment,” or
“interdependence” version of the step transaction doctrine was used. Hence, the
intermediary step of distributing the assets up to the partners would be disregarded in
determining the tax consequences of the overall transaction. See generally BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 72, at ¶ 4.3.5; Stephen S. Bowen, The End Result Test, 72 TAXES
722, 722 (1994).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2002) (respecting the assets-up
form of merger “[d]espite the partners’ transitory ownership of the terminated
partnership’s assets”); id. § 1.708-1(d)(3)(ii) (respecting the assets-up form of division
“[d]espite the partners’ transitory ownership of some of the prior partnership’s assets”).
89. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,540 (May 18, 1978).
90. Under Section 351, if a transferor transfers property to a corporation in
exchange for stock of the corporation and is in “control” of the corporation immediately
after the transfer, no gain or loss is generally recognized. I.R.C. § 351 (2000). In order
to meet the “control” test, the transferors must own at least 80% of the total voting power
of all classes of the corporation’s stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total
number of shares of each class of non-voting stock. I.R.C. § 368(c) (2000). In applying
this rule, the Service usually takes into account any preplanned transfers. See generally
2 M ARTIN D. G INSBURG & J ACK S. L EVIN, M ERGERS , A CQUISITIONS AND B UYOUTS
¶ 608.3.4 (2006) (collecting authorities). Thus, allowing an assets-over incorporation to
be treated as a non-recognition event under Section 351 is an exception to the general
rule because the partnership has a prearranged plan to transfer the corporate stock immediately
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tax treatment of substantively equivalent transactions, could also be explained
as a tiebreaker; “when the form and substance of a transaction are
consistent, that form should be respected even though it was chosen in
order to enhance tax efficiency and even though other (presumably less
tax-efficient) forms could have been utilized to achieve the same (nontax) economic results.”91
Notwithstanding these plausible explanations for regarding form in
incorporation transactions, the end result of disparate tax consequences
from incorporation structures, which result in substantively equivalent
transactions despite their technical distinctions, remains unsatisfying for
a number of reasons.92 First, there are possible alternate approaches for
dealing with the Section 351 issue in the assets-over form.93 Also, this
result conflicts with the overarching policy concerns of neutrality,
fairness, and efficiency discussed in Part III.A. Lastly, for non-tax reasons,
some taxpayers have difficulty or are entirely unable to structure their
transaction to obtain the desired tax results, as also discussed in Part III.A.
This Article’s proposal, as outlined in Part IV, would protect Section
351 treatment, allow for the use of all three incorporation constructs, and
minimize neutrality, fairness, and efficiency concerns.
2. Simplicity and Administrability
Simplicity and administrability also do not explain the deviations from
the goals of neutrality, fairness, and efficiency identified in Part III.A.94
receiving the stock in exchange for a contribution of assets to the corporation. Meeting
the control test of Section 351 is not a problem under the assets-up or interests-over
forms of incorporation because in each of those cases the partners make the direct
contribution to the corporation in exchange for the corporation’s stock.
91. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 498.
92. But see Banoff, supra note 3 (generally endorsing an approach that adheres to
form).
93. For example, the Service could take the approach that it took in Rev. Rul.
2003-51, 2003-1 C.B. 938, which concluded that the Section 351 control test was not
violated by prearranged multiple drop-downs of the stock received in the first exchange
as long as there was an “alternative form of transaction that would have qualified for
nonrecognition treatment.” Rev. Rul. 2003-51, 2003-1 C.B. 938, 940. Specifically, the
Service could rule that the Section 351 control test is not violated by the partnership’s
prearranged liquidating distribution of the corporate stock to the partners because there
are other forms of transactions, specifically the assets-up and interests-over forms, that
would have qualified under Section 351.
94. As used herein, “simplification,” which is an oft-discussed goal of tax reform,
generally refers to the goal of a tax system that minimizes complexity to the extent
possible. See generally AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 73;
Inst. for Policy Innovation, supra note 73; William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, Effects of
Tax Simplification Options: A Quantitative Analysis, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
276, 276 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR TAX SIMPLIFICATION (2002), available at
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Despite the Service’s intent to create an appropriately simple and
administrable system,95 the rules regarding the tax analysis of partnership
mergers, divisions, and incorporations are simultaneously too simple and
not simple enough.
The partnership merger, division, and incorporation rules are too
simple in three respects. First, the rules allow the use of only the assetsover fiction for formless mergers, divisions, and incorporations. Query
why only one fiction is permitted to apply to a transaction when other,
equally plausible, fictions could be used to explain and analyze the same
transaction. Second, the merger rules do not allow the interestsover construct. The Service allowed only the assets-over and assets-up
constructs for mergers in an effort “to provide a set of administrable
rules that taxpayers and the IRS could apply in characterizing these
transactions.”96 In specifically choosing not to allow an interests-over
construct, the Service cites “problems . . . that are not present with respect to
partnership incorporations.”97 “The operation of [Section 704(c) and
737] breaks down if the partner is treated as contributing an asset that is
different from the asset that the partnership is treated as receiving.”98
However, given that the interests-over merger construct, if allowed,
might have the best tax results for the taxpayer,99 and given that the

http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/tax/Tax_Policy_stmt2.pdf; N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
(2002), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentGroups/Section_Information1/
Tax_Section_Reports/1007report.pdf; Edwards, supra note 77, at 130–32 (discussing
problems that flow from complexity). See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 72, at 45–47. As used herein, “administrability” generally refers to the
ability of the Service to administer the tax system, including cost-effective collection
and enforcement. See generally AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note
73; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72, at 49–52.
95. Before Revenue Ruling 84-111 and the Section 708 Regulations, partnership
incorporations and mergers were analyzed using only an assets-over construct. See
supra notes 13–14. Although this single construct approach was simple and easy to
administer, by publishing Revenue Ruling 84-111 and promulgating the Section 708
Regulations the IRS accepted multiple constructs and implicitly acknowledged that the
single construct approach oversimplified the analysis by trying to “provide a set of
administrable rules.” T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496.
96. T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496.
97. Partnership Mergers and Acquisitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 1572, 1573 (proposed Jan.
11, 2000).
98. Id.
99. See Kalinka, supra note 58.
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Section 704(c) and Section 737 concerns are surmountable,100 the marginal
increase in complexity associated with allowing a third construct for
partnership mergers seems justifiable. Third, the merger rules only
allow partial interests sales pursuant to the buyout rule in the assets-over
construct and not the assets-up construct.101 The buyout rule could be
easily expanded to provide explicitly for interest sales prior to any asset
construct merger, thus ensuring that a partner wishing to sell out can
avail itself of the tax treatment provided in Section 741 regardless of
how the transaction is structured. The provision could be based on, and
could operate in precisely the same way as, the assets-over version of the
buyout rule.102
In addition to oversimplifying, the rules regarding the use of the
assets-up construct introduce unnecessary complexity by imposing
nuanced requirements on the ability to obtain assets-up treatment.103
Less sophisticated taxpayers are disadvantaged because they may not
fully understand how to avail themselves of the assets-up construct, and
thus are more likely, albeit inadvertently, to become subject to the default
assets-over fiction. Additionally, the particularities of the assets-up
requirements increase the costs of administering and monitoring compliance
with the partnership transaction rules because they require the Service to
delve into the individual local law of transfers in order to see whether a
purported assets-up transaction really qualifies for analysis under the
assets-up construct.
Since the partnership merger, division, and incorporation rules do not
strike the right balance of simplicity and administrability, these considerations
cannot justify the disparate tax consequences of the different forms of
partnership transactions. In fact, rectifying each of the outlined
oversimplifications and overcomplications would actually advance the
goals of neutrality, fairness, and equity, and can be accomplished without
substantially increasing the burden of administering these rules.104

100. See id. at 26–27 (discussing how §§ 704(c) and 737 could apply to an interestsover merger).
101. The articulated policy rationale for the buyout rule is that:
The IRS and Treasury believe that, under certain circumstances, when
partnerships merge and one partner does not become a partner in the resulting
partnership, the receipt of cash or property by that partner should be treated as
a sale of that partner’s interest in the terminating partnership to the resulting
partnership, not a disguised sale of the terminating partnership’s assets.
Partnership Mergers and Acquisitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 1574. This rationale seems to
apply equally to any merger construct.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(4) (as amended in 2002).
103. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2, II.C.2.
104. See infra Part IV (suggesting such a proposal).
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3. A Broader Approach to Equity Considerations—Consistency
with Related Tax Provisions
Part III.A was concerned with equity in the tax treatment of the
various forms of substantively equivalent partnership mergers, divisions,
and incorporations. However, the rules on these transactions are part of
a larger scheme of rules that addresses the tax consequences of transfers
of partnership interests and changes in form—that is, among entities
characterized as corporations, partnerships, and disregarded entities.
Equity considerations within this larger context are an important part of
providing a cohesive framework for treating similar partnership transactions
similarly and different partnership transactions differently,105 and are
useful in analyzing whether the disparate treatment of the various forms
of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations can be justified.
The key sets of rules with which the partnership merger, division, and
incorporation rules should be coordinated are the check-the-box regulations
regarding elective changes to an entity’s tax classification, and the
authorities regarding transfers of partnership interests, including the
Section 708 “technical termination” regulations and Revenue Ruling 996.106 These sets of rules are discussed in turn.
105. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing and defining equity
considerations).
106. One could assert that many other sets of rules ought to be included in this list,
such as the rulings regarding conversions between different partnership forms (for
example, Rev. Rul. 84-25, 1984-1 C.B. 157) or even the rules regarding transfers of
interests and assets under Subchapter C (that is, Sections 301 to 385 of the Code). The
rulings regarding conversions between different partnership forms are omitted from this
discussion because they essentially conclude, without much discussion of the construct
for the conversion, that the conversion is not a recognition event, except to the extent
that the partners have different shares of the entity’s liability after the conversion. See
Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157; Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-1 C.B. 130. However, it is
interesting to note that although these conversions could potentially be effectuated
through a number of different forms for state law purposes, these rulings seem to adopt
an interests-over construct for the conversion, so that partners are treated as exchanging
their old partnership interests for new partnership interests in a transaction governed by
Section 721 of the Code. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES ¶ 12.04[1] (2006). See generally Sheldon I. Banoff, Partnership
Ownership Realignments via Partnership Reallocations, Legal Status Changes,
Recapitalizations and Conversions: What Are the Tax Consequences?, 83 TAXES 105
(2005) (discussing the realization, recognition, and resulting tax consequences arising
from conversions, among other partnership ownership changes). The Subchapter C
restructuring rules are omitted from this list because of the vast differences between the
Subchapter C and Subchapter K regimes for taxing business entities. Nonetheless, a
number of the criticisms levied in this Article against the Subchapter K merger, division,
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a. Check-the-Box Regulations107
The check-the-box regulations provide that a partnership that makes
an entity classification election to be taxable as a corporation is deemed
to undertake an assets-over incorporation for federal income tax
purposes.108 The Service adopted this assets-over fiction in Revenue
Ruling 2004-59, concluding that the tax consequences of incorporations
effectuated under state law formless conversion statutes are also
determined based on an assets-over fiction.109 Although formless state
law incorporations and check-the-box conversions are afforded equivalent
treatment for federal income tax purposes, these methods of incorporation
are treated differently than other methods of incorporation, which under
Revenue Ruling 84-111 can be analyzed under three alternative
constructs.110 In order to justify allowing only one construct rather than
three, which is a departure from Revenue Ruling 84-111, the preamble to
the check-the-box regulations cites Revenue Ruling 84-111’s adherence to
form,111 as well as the Service’s desire to “achieve administrative
simplicity.”112 Further, in order to justify the choice of the assets-over
construct as the single fiction to impose, the preamble to the proposed
check-the-box regulations indicates a desire to “minimize the tax
consequences of the change in classification,” but does not conclude that
the assets-over construct necessarily produces the best tax result for
taxpayers in all circumstances.113 These statements provide only a weak
justification, at best, for the differential tax treatment of check-the-box
conversions and state law formless incorporations on one hand, and state
and incorporation rules could also be levied against the reorganization rules in
Subchapter C. I leave the comparison of the Subchapter K and Subchapter C restructuring
rules to another day. See generally Steinberg, supra note 1, for a useful discussion about
the role of substance and form in Subchapter C, including in the context of reorganizations.
107. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006); see also supra notes 53–54
and accompanying text (discussing the check-the-box rules).
108. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 2006).
109. Rev. Rul. 2004-59, 2004-21 C.B. 1050.
110. See supra Part II.C. (discussing Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88).
111. Treatment of Changes in Elective Entity Classification, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,768
(proposed Oct. 28, 1997) (“The proposed regulations do not affect the holdings in Rev.
Rul. 84-111 (1984-2 C.B. 88), in which the IRS ruled that it would respect the particular
form undertaken by the taxpayers when a partnership converts to a corporation.”).
Because elective conversions are transactions without actual form, the IRS
and Treasury believe that it is appropriate to provide that only one transaction
form will be applied to each type of elective conversion. Furthermore, while
the check-the-box regulations provide an elective regime for classifying
eligible entities, the elective regime was not intended to substitute for actual
transactions in all situations.
T.D. 8844, 1999-2 C.B. 661, 662.
112. Treatment of Changes in Elective Entity Classification, 62 Fed. Reg. at 55,769.
113. Id.
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law incorporations effectuated through an actual form on the other hand.
Further, as discussed below in Part IV.A.2.c, the Service’s more general
rationale for the adoption of the check-the-box regulations seems to
lend greater support to allowing more taxpayer choice in the tax
treatment of incorporations, which could more closely align the tax
treatment of check-the-box conversions, state law formless conversions,
and state law formal conversions.
Even if no change is made to the tax treatment of check-the-box
conversions, state law formless conversions could be treated in a manner
more similar to the constructs in Revenue Ruling 84-111 without
violating principles of equity. Revenue Ruling 2004-59’s reliance on the
check-the-box regulations reflects the Service’s implicit assumption that
a formless state law incorporation is more analogous to a partnership’s
check-the-box election to be taxable as a corporation than it is to a
partnership incorporation effectuated through one of the forms described
in Revenue Ruling 84-111.114 This analogy seems inappropriate given
that a check-the-box incorporation is only a change of federal income
tax status and does not change the identity of the entity or affect the
application of the state law business statutes. In contrast, a state law
incorporation, whether undertaken in a formless manner or in one of the
prescribed forms, is not merely a tax change; it is an actual change to the
entity and the entity’s state law rights and responsibilities. Accordingly,
the better way to balance the equities is to conclude that deemed changes
in tax classification are sufficiently different from changes in tax
classification that result from actual changes to the parties’ rights and
responsibilities under state law. Under this approach, it is reasonable for
check-the-box conversions to be treated differently from state law
formless incorporations; because formless incorporations result in an
actual change to the taxpayer, their tax treatment incorporations should
be based on the three constructs from Revenue Ruling 84-111.

114.

Rev. Rul. 2004-59, 2004-21 C.B. 1050.
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b. Transfers of Partnership Interests
The preamble to the Proposed Section 708 Regulations cites the rules
regarding technical terminations under Section 708(b)(1)(B) as precedent
for “formless movements of a partnership’s assets” in support for imposing
the assets-over fiction on formless mergers and divisions.115 Section
708(b)(1)(B) provides that a partnership will be treated as “terminated”
if “within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent or
more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits.”116 Treasury
Regulation § 1.708-1(b)(4) provides that, upon such “technical termination,”
the partnership is treated as undertaking an assets-over transaction.117
However, using the technical termination rules as precedent for applying
an assets-over fiction to formless transfers is unfounded because a technical
termination is far from formless. Rather, a technical termination occurs
upon a formal transfer of interests, and it is the regulations that recast
this actual transfer of interests into a fictional transfer of assets. Because
technical terminations are sufficiently distinguishable from formless
mergers, the technical termination rules ought to have little probative value
in determining the fiction that should be applied to formless transactions.
Although technical terminations are not analogous to formless
transactions, the technical termination rules and Revenue Ruling 99-6,
both of which involve tax constructs applied when partnership interests
are transferred, may be relevant for determining, from an equitable
perspective, how partnership mergers effectuated through the transfer of
interests should be treated for tax purposes. As discussed above, the
technical termination rules provide that if 50% or more of the interests in
a partnership are sold or exchanged within a twelve-month period, the

115. Partnership Mergers and Divisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 1572, 1574 (proposed Jan.
11, 2000). The Service also cited the check-the-box regulations in selecting an approach
to the tax treatment of formless partnership mergers and divisions. However, as with
formless incorporations, formless mergers are even less similar to check-the-box
conversions than are formless incorporations, such that formless mergers and divisions
need not be treated in a manner similar to check-the-box conversions. See supra Part
III.B.3.a.
116. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) (2000). This is commonly referred to as a “technical
termination.” The termination is “technical” in that the partnership may be treated as
terminating for tax purposes, even though it continues to exist for state law purposes and
continues to operate the same business, albeit with some different owners.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(4) (as amended in 2002) (treating the partnership as
contributing all of its assets to a new partnership in exchange for interests in the new
partnership, and then distributing the interests in the new partnership to the partners in
liquidation). Note that prior to T.D. 8717, 1997-1 C.B. 125, interest transfers that
resulted in technical terminations were treated as if the partnership undertook an assetsup transaction.
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partnership is treated as undertaking an assets-over transaction.118 The
current regulations regarding the tax treatment of partnership mergers
effectuated in an interests-over form are consistent with this assets-over
treatment.119 On the other hand, Revenue Ruling 99-6 provides that the
purchase by one person of all of the interests in a partnership is treated
as an interests-over transaction, as in Revenue Ruling 84-111 and
McCauslen v. Commissioner.120 The Final Section 708 Regulations are
not consistent with Revenue Ruling 99-6; if all of the interests in a
partnership were acquired by another partnership in a merger, Revenue
Ruling 99-6 would seem to support allowing an interests-over construct,
but the Final Section 708 Regulations would recast the transaction using
an assets-over fiction. Although the Proposed Section 708 Regulations and
Final Section 708 Regulations were promulgated after Revenue Ruling
99-6 was published, neither addresses this inconsistency.121 Juxtaposing
the technical termination rules and Revenue Ruling 99-6 produces an odd
result, assuming both are respected—if the partners transfer 50% or
more, but not all, of the interests in a partnership to one person, the
assets-over construct applies, but if the partners transfer 100% of the
interests in the partnership to one person, the interests-over construct
applies. In the face of this incongruity, it seems just as reasonable, from
an equitable perspective, to analyze a partnership merger structured in an
interests-over form under an interests-over construct as it does to treat
118. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(4) (as amended in 2002).
119. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the application of the assets-over fiction to
mergers taken in an interests-over form).
120. Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 432; McCauslen v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 588 (1966).
121. One commentator, attempting (unsuccessfully) to rationalize Revenue Ruling
99-6 with the disregard for the interests-over construct in partnership mergers, explains
as follows:
Thus, it seems that the IRS and Treasury have implicitly limited Rev. Rul. 99-6
to nonpartnership acquirors or, perhaps, to nonpartnership acquirors and to
partnership acquirors in fully taxable transactions. This would be consistent
with the views of one IRS official, who has indicated that, although he had not
previously considered this potential conflict between Rev. Rul. 99-6 and the
Proposed Regulations, he finds significant the fact that the partners in Rev.
Rul. 99-6 “sell” their interests for cash. Because a merger transaction, according to
this official, involves an “exchange” rather than a sale, the Ruling would not
apply. This view, however, does not seem to be consistent with [Gen. Couns.
Mem. 37,540 (May 18, 1978)], underlying Rev. Rul. 84-111[, 1984-2 C.B.
88] . . . suggesting that McCauslen applies to partnership incorporations, which
also are exchanges rather than sale transactions.
Eric B. Sloan et al., New Prop. Regs. Provide Expanded Guidance on Partnership
Mergers and Divisions—Part 1, 93 J. TAX’N. 198, 206 n.40 (2000).
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the transaction under an assets-over construct. Hence, looking to the tax
treatment in similar transactions seems to provide little guidance regarding
the proper treatment of partnership mergers that are structured as
interests-over forms.
4. Revenue Generation
Which construct results in more revenue will depend on the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction.122 Just as there are
situations in which an assets-over, assets-up, or interests-over construct
is preferred by the taxpayer over the other constructs,123 there are
scenarios where each of the constructs as applied to incorporations,
mergers, and divisions could produce more or less revenue than the other
constructs. In fact, it is precisely the proposition that one construct may
be less costly from a tax perspective than another form that presents the
questions of neutrality and fairness in the first place. Thus, the need for
revenue generation does not explain the disparate treatment of the
different forms of transactions.
5. Non-Tax Policy—Protection of Partners
Tax rules can also be used to accomplish non-tax goals.124 Although
the Service’s statements about the partnership merger, division, and
incorporation rules do not indicate an intent to use these rules to
accomplish non-tax goals, it is possible that non-tax goals, such as the
protection of partners, could have informed or might help explain the
imposition of an assets-over default rule and the differential treatment of
the various tax forms. For example, if a formless transaction could be
effectuated without unanimous consent of the partners, then treating that
transaction, for tax purposes, under a construct that produced the most
taxpayer-favorable tax result would help protect partners from adverse
tax consequences in case transactions are undertaken without their
consent. Alternatively, treating such a transaction under a construct that
produced the least taxpayer-favorable tax result could incentivize the
parties to obtain unanimous consent in order to opt out of the adverse tax
treatment, thereby protecting partners by making it more likely that any
transaction taken will be taken with the consent of each partner.
122. Revenue generation is a sine qua non of the federal income tax system.
123. See supra Part II.D.
124. For example, the Code contains numerous tax incentives that are designed to
encourage or discourage certain behavior deemed beneficial or detrimental, respectively,
from a non-tax social policy perspective. See generally Surrey, supra note 72 (discussing
the use of the tax rules to implement government policy).
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Setting aside the debate about which type of incentive would be more
desirable, an incentive system of this sort could only be effective if it
was clear what voting rights would be afforded to partners in each different
form of transaction, and if it was clear which construct predictably
produced the most and least taxpayer-favorable tax results. However, as
discussed above, neither is clear. 125 Accordingly, the differential
tax treatment of the various tax transaction constructs does not seem to
be explainable by a desire to protect partners. Moreover, the disparate
treatment should not be explained by a partner protection goal; if it is
determined that partners need more protection than they are already
afforded, that protection should be implemented either through the
applicable state law statutes governing partnerships or on a case-by-case
basis through the individual partnership agreements.
C. Objecting to Disparate Treatment
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that failure of the rules governing
the tax treatment of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations to
meet the goals of neutrality, fairness, and efficiency is not justified by
any of the above discussed policy considerations. Moreover, analyzing
the partnership merger, division, and incorporation rules in light of these
goals only strengthens the assertion that the existing rules do not strike
the right balance with regard to the use of substance, form, and fiction.
Accordingly, these rules are ripe for reform.

125. As to the ability to predict which constructs produce the most and least
favorable tax results for the taxpayer, the benefits and detriments of a tax construct
depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the situation. See supra Part II.D.
As to partner voting rights under each construct, state law often allows partners to
designate in a partnership agreement what portion of the partners must approve a
transaction, so it would be unreasonable for the federal tax law to make assumptions
about what voting rights were afforded to partners in different transactions. See supra
note 71. Moreover, since there are already statutory regimes intended to set out the
rights and responsibilities of partners and partnerships, such as the ULPA, UPA and
ULLCA, and since partners can often establish their rights through contract, query why
the tax law should be used to protect those who already have a statutory regime designed
to address their issues and those who (at least those with sufficient leverage) already
have the opportunity to protect themselves.
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IV. PICKING A SIDE: A PROPOSAL TO ALLOW TAXPAYERS
TO ELECT A FICTION
A. Choosing Fiction
1. The Partnership Restructuring Election—A Proposal
In order to address the issues raised in Part III, partnerships should be
allowed to make an explicit election of which construct applies to their
merger, division, or incorporation, regardless of the actual form of the
transaction.126 The election, which is referred to in this Article as the
“Partnership Restructuring Election,” would work as follows.
Taxpayers would implement the form of merger, division, or incorporation
most preferable from a business perspective. Regardless of the form of
transaction chosen, the entities involved in the transaction could elect
which construct would apply to the transaction for federal income tax
purposes.127 For incorporations and mergers, the parties would choose
among the assets-over, assets-up, and interests-over constructs; for divisions,
they would choose between the assets-over and assets-up constructs.128
If no election were made, the assets-over construct would apply as a
default. The merger buyout rule would be made available in conjunction
with any merger construct.
In order to make the election of construct, the entities involved in the
transaction would jointly file a form of transaction election with the IRS
no later than the due date for the terminated partnership’s return for the
year of the transaction, including extensions.129 The Partnership
126. In the context of formless incorporations, others have similarly suggested
allowing partnerships to elect the tax construct applicable.
Why is the latitude available to taxpayers on actual conversions not extended
to actual conversions involving “formless” incorporations as well as elective
conversions? . . .
. . . Parties should decide their preferred tax treatment, they should agree to
report the transactions consistently both for themselves and the partnership,
and the IRS should accord their choice controlling governance.
Philip F. Postlewaite, The Transmogrification of Subchapter K, 83 TAXES 189, 201
(2005). But see Banoff, supra note 3 (generally endorsing an approach that adheres to
form).
127. Note that there are a number of potential structures pursuant to which a
merger, division, or incorporation can be effectuated, but in an effort to ensure that this
proposal is sufficiently simple and administrable, this proposal suggests that taxpayers
only have a choice of three constructs. That said, taxpayers are still free to effectuate
transactions in any manner that they see fit, as it is only for purposes of the tax analysis
that they are limited to these three choices.
128. Recall that for divisions, there is no interests-over construct. See supra Part
II.B.
129. This is consistent with the due dates for Section 754 elections (elections made
with respect to the tax consequences of sales or exchanges of interests in partnerships).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1(b) (as amended in 2000).
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Restructuring Election would be required to be filed jointly by the
relevant entities,130 which in an incorporation are the pre-incorporation
partnership and the post-incorporation corporation, in a merger are the
terminated partnership and the resulting partnership, and in a division
are the divided partnership (or if none, the prior partnership) and the
recipient partnership (or if none, the resulting partnerships). Like many
other partnership tax elections,131 this election would be made at the
partnership, and not the partner, level; however, partners are, of course,
free to incorporate into the partnership agreement limitations on the
partnership’s ability to make certain tax elections without partner consent.
The partnerships would be bound to report the transaction in a manner
consistent with the election, including on the Schedule K-1s that the
partnership issues to the partners. Accordingly, as long as the partners
report their income in a manner consistent with the K-1s that they
receive, the partners would effectively be bound by the election as well.
The current anti-abuse rule for mergers and divisions would remain in
place and would be expanded to cover incorporations. This would give
the IRS the ability to recast a transaction in accordance with its substance if
the transaction is part of a larger series of transactions and the substance
of the larger series of transactions is inconsistent with following the
fiction elected.
2. Analogizing to Other Explicit Tax Elections
The tax code is littered with tax elections, some explicit, whereby a
taxpayer files a statement with the Service selecting a specific alternative,132
and some implicit, whereby a taxpayer takes a certain action among
various possible actions, thereby producing a particular tax result.133
130. This requirement is analogous to the requirement imposed in connection with
the making of a Section 338(h)(10) election. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3) (as
amended in 2006). In addition, requiring a joint filing obligates the relevant entities to
agree to treat the transaction consistently, thereby avoiding the risk of government
whipsaw.
131. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1 (as amended in 2000) (stating Section 754
elections are made by the partnership); AICPA Tax Division’s P’ship Taxation
Technical Res. Panel, Partnership Elections Grid, 36 TAX ADVISER 200 (2005) (detailing
a number of partnership elections).
132. See infra Parts IV.A.2.a–c (discussing three such examples).
133. Tax shelters are the most obvious example of taxpayers choosing among
different actions that produce different tax results, but implicit elections need not be
abusive. For example, an entity that chooses to raise capital as debt rather than equity is
making a choice between having the tax consequences associated with debt (for
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Treasury Regulation § 1.708-1 and Revenue Ruling 84-111 already set
up a system for an implicit election between certain transaction fictions;
by taking certain actions rather than others, a taxpayer can implicitly
elect between an assets-over and assets-up construct for mergers and
divisions, and among assets-over, assets-up, and interests-over constructs
for incorporations.134 This Article’s proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election would make this election explicit, and would remove the
barriers that impede access to the implicit election by eliminating the tax
impact of the non-tax factors that drive taxpayers to undertake a
particular form of transaction over another.135
There is already precedent in the tax law for explicit elections of this
type, where a taxpayer has the opportunity to choose to apply a tax
fiction to a transaction in order to override the tax consequences of an
actual form, or in the absence of certainty about the tax consequences of
an actual form. For example, the Partnership Restructuring Election can
be analogized to elections under Section 338, elections under Section
754, and check-the-box elections.
a. Section 338 Election—Treating Stock Purchases Like
Asset Purchases
Elections under Section 338 of the Code allow taxpayers who
purchase at least 80% of a corporation’s stock, by total vote and value,
to elect whether to determine the tax consequences of the acquisition on
the basis of a fiction rather than the stock purchase form.136 The precise
fictions differ depending on which version of Section 338 election is
made, but both versions enable taxpayers to choose to impose an asset

example, corporate level interest deduction, and holders pay tax at ordinary income rates
on the interest) rather than having the tax consequences associated with equity (for
example, no deduction for dividends paid, but individual holders may be able to pay tax
at reduced rates, and corporate holders may benefit from the dividends-received
deduction).
134. See supra Part II (discussing different actions that lead to the application of
different constructs). The Service has acknowledged the implicit nature of this election.
Revenue Ruling 84-111 explains that “[r]ecognition of the three possible methods to
incorporate a partnership . . . will facilitate flexibility . . . .” Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2
C.B. 88, 89. However, in promulgating the Final Section 708 Regulations, the Service
acknowledged, but wanted to limit, the elective nature of the partnership merger and
division rules. T.D. 8925, 2001-1 C.B. 496, 497 (“[T]he IRS and Treasury did not intend
to establish a regime whereby partners essentially could elect between the Assets-Up
Form and the Assets-Over Form by creating different documents that have the same
legal effect.”).
135. See supra Part III.A.
136. I.R.C. § 338(d)(3) (2000).
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purchase fiction on a stock purchase form of transaction.137 The
purposes of the enactment of Section 338 included simplification, the
desire to mitigate the differences between asset acquisitions and stock
acquisitions, and the desire to allow acquirers to obtain a stepped-up
basis in the target assets (a consequence of asset acquisitions but
generally not of stock acquisitions) without actually requiring the parties
to undertake the formal steps that would lead to the stepped-up basis.138
Like Section 338, a key purpose of the Partnership Restructuring
Election proposed herein is to mitigate the differences between the various
forms of partnership transactions. That purpose would be effectuated by
allowing taxpayers to elect whether to impose a tax fiction for purposes
of determining the tax consequences of the transaction.139 As with the
Section 338 fictions,140 the tax consequences of the proposed Partnership

137. When any Section 338 election is made, two separate corporations—the “old”
target corporation and the “new” target corporation—are deemed to exist for tax
purposes. If an election is made under Section 338(g), the tax consequences of the
transaction are determined as if both (1) the old target sold all of its assets to the new
target and (2) the old target stockholders sold all of their target stock. I.R.C. § 338(a)
(2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.338-1 (as amended in 2006). See generally 1 MARTIN D. GINSBURG &
JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS ¶ 205 (2006) (discussing
“regular” Section 338 elections). If an election is made under Section 338(h)(10), the
target corporation is deemed to sell all of its assets, distribute the proceeds to its owner,
and cease to exist; the formal stock sale is ignored for purposes of determining the tax
consequences of the transaction. I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)
(as amended in 2006). See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra, at ¶ 206 (discussing
Section 338(h)(10) elections).
138. See S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 191–97 (2d Sess. 1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 949–55; H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 535–40 (2d Sess. 1982) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1190, 1309–14. See generally James T. Chudy
et al., Stock Purchases Treated as Asset Acquisitions—Section 338, 788 Tax Mgmt
Portfolio, Part I.B. (discussing the legislative history behind Section 338); Raymond P.
Wexler & William R. Welke, Section 338—Consistency and Complexity, 63 TAXES 916,
917 (1985) (discussing the background behind Section 338).
139. Note that the Section 338 election only allows a unidirectional election; it
permits taxpayers to choose to treat a formal interest sale as a fictional asset sale, but
does not allow taxpayers to choose to treat a formal asset sale as a fictional interest sale.
In contrast, the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election proposes a multidirectional
election, where a formal interest transfer can be treated as a fictional asset transfer (either
assets-over or assets-up), and a formal asset transfer can be treated as a fictional interest
transfer or as a different type of fictional asset transfer. See infra Part IV.A.2.c (discussing
the check-the-box regulations as an example of a multidirectional election).
140. Given that the tax consequences that arise from a Section 338(g) election are
usually unfavorable for taxpayers, except in limited situations such as certain acquisitions of
foreign targets and acquisitions of domestic targets with significant and expiring net
operating losses, Section 338(g) elections are rare. However, Section 338(h)(10)

299

FIELD.DOC

8/16/2007 10:22:29 AM

Restructuring fictions can be beneficial or detrimental to taxpayers
depending on their individual situations,141 so Section 338, like the
proposed Partnership Restructuring Election, leaves the choice of tax
fiction to the discretion of the taxpayers. Admittedly, Section 338 applies to
corporations and not partnerships. Given the many differences between
Subchapter C and Subchapter K, and given some of the complicated
Subchapter C issues surrounding the enactment of Section 338,142 the
analogy between Section 338 and the proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election is far from perfect. Nonetheless, it is a useful example of a
situation in which a taxpayer could undertake a single economic
transaction in more than one form, but instead selects one particular
form for the legal steps in the transaction and elects to determine the tax
consequences based on the fiction of another form.
b. Section 754 Election—Adjusting Asset Basis Upon Interest
Transfers and Property Distributions
Within Subchapter K, if a partnership makes a Section 754 election,
the basis in partnership property is adjusted upon the sale or exchange of
an interest in the partnership and upon the distribution of property out
of the partnership.143 The regulations under Section 754 (and under
Sections 734 and 743, which are triggered by a Section 754 election) do
not explicitly create an asset-transfer fiction like the Section 338
regulations do. However, the Section 754 election very generally shifts
the tax analysis of transfers of partnership interests and distributions of
partnership property away from an approach that respects the formal
transactions, and toward a fictionalized approach that determines certain
tax consequences of the transaction in a manner more akin to the way in
which the tax consequences would be determined if the partners owned a
direct interest in the partnership assets. This is essentially an election
between an “entity” and “aggregate” approach to partnerships.144
elections are quite common. See generally GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 137, at
¶¶ 204–206; Chudy, supra note 138.
141. See supra Part II.D.
142. The effect of the General Utilities doctrine on corporate transactions is one
example of such complications. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200
(1935).
143. I.R.C. § 734(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Note that any adjustment to the basis
of partnership property under Section 743(b) is treated as an adjustment with respect to
the transferee partner only.
144. For example, if a Section 754 election is in effect, a transferee of partnership
interests becomes entitled to the same aggregate basis in its share of the partnership
assets as it would have had if the transferee had actually acquired direct interests in the
assets. The adjustment to the asset basis accounts for the difference between the
transferee partner’s proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property
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Similarly, the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election would
allow partners in mergers and incorporations to elect whether to regard
transfers of interests or whether to analyze the tax consequences of a
transaction as a deemed transfer of the underlying assets (either as an
assets-over fiction or an assets-up fiction). Moreover, allowing the
partnership to elect an aggregate approach to mergers, divisions, and
incorporations should mean that the partnership is not required to make
actual distributions of the assets up out of the partnership in order to
have the assets-up construct apply, since the aggregate approach to
partnership already treats the partners as owning direct interests in the
assets. As with Section 338 and the proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election, the Section 754 election’s shift to a more fictionalized
approach can be beneficial or detrimental to the parties depending on the
particular facts and circumstances,145 but, subject to certain limitations,146
taxpayers are afforded the choice of whether or not to make the Section
754 election and the resulting basis adjustments under Sections 734(b)
and 743(b).
c. Check-the-Box Election—Choosing Entity Characterization
The check-the-box regulations also provide a useful comparison to the
proposed Partnership Restructuring Election, both because the checkthe-box regulations are an example of an explicit tax election that offers
taxpayers the flexibility to choose one tax construct over another and
because the check-the-box regulations are part of the larger analysis of
and the transferee’s basis in its partnership interest. I.R.C. § 743(b) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004). However, the fiction is not fully respected, in that the allocation of the basis
among the assets under Section 755 may differ from the allocation that would have been
made if the transferee had acquired direct interests in the partnership assets. See
generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 16, at ¶¶ 24.01, 25.01 (discussing how Section 754
changes the analysis under Sections 743(b) and 734(b), respectively, from an entity
approach to partnerships to an aggregate approach to partnerships).
145. See generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 16, at ¶¶ 24.01-.12, 25.01-.07
(discussing the details and consequences of making a Section 754 election).
146. Basis adjustments are mandatory under Section 734 and 743 if there are
substantial built-in losses. I.R.C. §§ 734(a) (requiring a Section 734(b) adjustment if
“there is a substantial basis adjustment”), 743(a) (requiring a Section 743(b) adjustment
if “the partnership has a substantial built-in loss immediately after [the] transfer”) (2000
& Supp. IV 2004). Also, once a Section 754 election is made, revocation generally
requires the approval of the Service. Treas. Reg. § 1.754-1(c) (as amended in 2000). In
addition, the elective nature of Section 754 has been the subject of debate in Congress
and may be changed in the future. See S. REP. NO. 108-192, at 188–90 (2003) (proposing that
Section 754 elections be mandatory and not elective).
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whether the partnership merger, division, and incorporation rules meet
the goal of equitable treatment.147 As discussed above, the check-thebox rules generally allow entities to elect whether to be taxable as a
corporation or as a partnership (or disregarded entity, in the case of a
wholly-owned entity),148 regardless of the entity’s default classification
under the check-the-box rules,149 and regardless of what the entity’s
classification would have been under the prior regulations.150 So too
does the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election contemplate that
taxpayers can choose among the various tax fictions regardless of form.
Although an analogy to the check-the-box regulations may support
allowing explicit elections in general, the particular treatment of
partnership-to-corporation conversions under the check-the-box regulations
conflicts with the way in which the proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election would treat incorporations.151 In the preamble to the check-thebox regulations, the Service explicitly rejected precisely the type of fullblown choice for incorporations proposed by the Partnership Restructuring
Election.152 Nevertheless, the rationale articulated in connection with the
promulgation of the check-the-box elections actually supports allowing an
elective approach, both for the check-the-box regulations themselves and
as suggested in the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election. As one
commentator said in connection with the proposed check-the-box elections,
“the lack of choice in the [check-the-box] regulations is inconsistent
with the[ir] intent.”153 Specifically, the partnership incorporation rules
and certain of the limitations on the use of the assets-up construct in
partnership mergers and divisions include a number of formalistic
distinctions.154 This formalism is based largely on differences in local
law and other distinctions that are not particularly meaningful for tax
purposes; the ability to obtain assets-up treatment should not depend on
147. See supra Part III.B.3.a.
148. Unlike the Section 338 election, the check-the-box election is multidirectional,
in that entities that would otherwise be treated as corporations can elect, with some
limitations, to be treated as partnerships or disregarded entities for tax purposes, and
entities that would otherwise be treated as partnerships or disregarded entities can elect
to be treated as corporations for tax purposes.
149. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (as amended in 2006) (providing default rules).
150. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1993) (determining whether an
entity was treated as a partnership or a corporation for tax purposes using a multifactored
test, which included a determination of whether the entity had continuity of life,
centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests).
151. See supra Parts II.C, III.B.3.a.
152. T.D. 8844, 1999-2 C.B. 661, 662 (rejecting commentators’ recommendations
“that taxpayers be allowed to choose which [construct] to apply to an elective
conversion,” which choice “would allow taxpayers to avoid having to take the actual
steps of a conversion to produce the most favorable tax results”).
153. Id.
154. See supra Parts II.A–C, III.B.1.
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the type of assets held by a particular partnership and the ease with
which a partnership can transfer the assets under local law pursuant to
contracts and otherwise.155 Further, as discussed herein, the regime governing
the tax analysis of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations
could be simplified,156 thereby avoiding some of the considerable and
inefficient expenditures that taxpayers might need to make in order to
take the steps that would ensure the application of the desired tax
construct.157
When faced with similar concerns in the past, where there were
“increasingly formalistic” rules based on “historical differences under
local law,”158 where “legal distinctions previously drawn . . . were no
longer meaningful,” and where “taxpayers still were required to expend
considerable resources to ensure that they obtained the classification they
desired,”159 the Service “replace[d] [the prior] rules with a much simpler
approach that generally is elective [the check-the-box regulations].”160
155. See supra Part III.A (discussing business limitations on obtaining preferred tax
treatment).
156. See supra Part III.B.2.
157. See supra Part III.A (discussing inefficiencies resulting from the current
partnership merger, division, and incorporation regime).
158. T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215, 216.
The existing regulations for classifying business organizations as associations
(which are taxable as corporations under § 7701(a)(3)) or as partnerships under
§ 7701(a)(2) are based on the historical differences under local law between
partnerships and corporations. Treasury and the IRS believe that those rules
have become increasingly formalistic. This document replaces those rules
with a much simpler approach that generally is elective.
Id.
159. T.D. 8844, 1999-2 C.B. 661, 662.
[T]he purpose of implementing the regime was to simplify an area of the law
where legal distinctions previously drawn in determining an entity’s
classification were no longer meaningful. While the factors considered under
prior law did not meaningfully distinguish between business organizations,
taxpayers still were required to expend considerable resources to ensure that
they obtained the classification they desired. Small business organizations
often lacked the resources and expertise to achieve their desired tax classification.
This was viewed as unfair. The IRS was also expending considerable resources
providing guidance on these classification issues. These same concerns generally
are not present in determining the form of a conversion transaction. Therefore,
the final regulations maintain only one form for each type of elective conversion.
Id.
160. T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215; see also Treatment of Changes in Elective Entity
Classification, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,768, 55,769 (proposed Oct. 28, 1997) (“The proposed
regulations provide a specific characterization for each of the four possible elective
changes. In each case, the characterization provided in the proposed regulations attempts
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Accordingly, it is submitted that the Service was mistaken when
concluding that the concerns that motivated the adoption of the checkthe-box regulations “generally are not present in determining the form of a
conversion transaction.”161 It is respectfully suggested that the treatment
of partnership-to-corporation check-the-box conversions be reconsidered,
and that the existing check-the-box regulations not be viewed as an
impediment to the adoption of the Partnership Restructuring Election
proposed herein.162
B. Achieving Consistent Treatment for Substantively Equivalent
Transactions While Furthering Other Policy Goals
By allowing partnerships to elect which tax fiction applies to a merger,
division, or incorporation, the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election
remedies the problem of disparate treatment discussed in Part III. Every
partnership engaged in a merger, division, or incorporation would be
given the same choice about tax fictions, and thus each transaction
would be treated in the same manner as other like transactions, regardless of
the actual form or formlessness of the transaction. Although the tax
consequences of a given merger, for example, may be determined based
on a different fiction than another merger if the partnerships involved in
the particular mergers elect different tax fictions, each partnership can
choose to implement whichever form is preferable from a business
perspective, without influence or distortion of incentives based on the
form’s tax consequences. This choice removes the discrimination that is
inherent in the current regime against certain taxpayers who, because of
their type of assets, industry, regulatory limitations, financing arrangements,
or other particular circumstances, cannot, without great difficulty or
expense, undertake transactions in the form that would entitle them to
determine their tax consequences based on the most favorable tax construct.
Hence, the Partnership Restructuring Election achieves the goal of
functional neutrality—impartial tax treatment among various forms
for mergers, divisions, and incorporations—where the current authorities do
to minimize the tax consequences of the change in classification and achieve
administrative simplicity.”).
161. T.D. 8844, 1999-2 C.B. 661, 662.
162. Changes to the treatment of partnership-to-corporation conversions under the
check-the-box regulations to allow taxpayers to elect the applicable construct might, on
the basis of equity considerations, mandate similar changes to the treatment of
corporation-to-partnership conversions, corporation-to-disregarded entity conversions,
and disregarded entity-to-corporation conversions. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g) (as
amended in 2006) (prescribing tax constructs applicable to each such conversion).
Alternatively, the Partnership Restructuring Election could be adopted without any
change to the check-the-box regulations on the basis articulated above in Part III.B.3.a.
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not. Further, under the Partnership Restructuring Election, if a formless
transaction is most efficient, partnerships would no longer be forced to
implement a form of transaction in order to obtain a particular tax result.
Rational partnerships would no longer be incentivized to divert resources
from more productive uses in order to pay for the increased business or
tax costs required to achieve competing tax or business goals.
Admittedly, the goal of functional neutrality could also be achieved by
adopting a single blended approach to the tax consequences of a
partnership merger, division, or incorporation. Such an approach would
impose a single set of rules that would override the provisions of
Subchapter K regarding tax consequences of distributions and transfers,
and would instead specify basis, holding period, recognition of gain, and
other consequences of partnership transactions regardless of the form of
the transaction. Under such a proposal, the implicit elections in the
existing regimes would be eliminated, and equal treatment would be
provided across the board for various forms of mergers, divisions, and
incorporations. Transaction costs would be reduced under such a regime
because partnerships would not need to analyze the various alternative
tax analyses in order to choose (implicitly, as in the current regimes, or
explicitly, under the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election) among
them. However, in order to adopt such a single approach, the Service
would have to choose among the current competing basis, holding
period, and gain recognition rules.163 Since it is not clear which rules
produce the most favorable result for the taxpayer or the government in
every situation, the choice of any single set of rules would necessarily
produce favorable results for some taxpayers and unfavorable results for
others depending on their particular facts and circumstances. This result
is often acceptable, but in the context of partnership restructurings, it is
hard to predict with any certainty which taxpayers will experience a
windfall from the chosen rules (and hence might be incentivized to
engage in an otherwise inefficient transaction), and which taxpayers will
be deprived of the use of properly obtained tax attributes as a result of
the chosen rules (and hence might refrain from engaging in otherwise
efficient transactions).
Moreover, adopting a single blended approach to the analysis of the
tax consequences of partnership mergers, divisions, and incorporations
would be a step backward toward the assets-over regimes that were in
163.

See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text.

305

FIELD.DOC

8/16/2007 10:22:29 AM

place under Revenue Rulings 68-289 and 70-239.164 Even though it
would provide equal treatment to restructurings regardless of their form,
a single blended approach would suffer from the same failure that doomed
these old rulings, namely, the failure to acknowledge and respect the
possibility that different tax consequences could arise from different
approaches to the transactions. In contrast, the proposed Partnership
Restructuring Election simultaneously acknowledges the various possible
tax consequences for a given type of restructuring and provides equal
treatment to the various forms of mergers, divisions, and incorporations
by allowing the relevant parties to elect which construct will be
employed for purposes of determining tax consequences.
Despite the Partnership Restructuring Election’s equal treatment of
like transactions, and although there is precedent for explicit elections
both in and out of Subchapter K, the proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election cannot resolve all broader equity considerations. Unless the
check-the-box regulations are changed to allow taxpayers to choose the
fiction applicable to the partnership-to-corporation conversion, the
treatment of these federal tax classification changes will differ from the
tax treatment of state law incorporations under the Partnership Restructuring
Election. Although this Article suggests that the IRS ought to reconsider
making the tax treatment of check-the-box conversions elective, in the
absence of such a change, differential treatment of the check-the-box
conversions and state law incorporations (whether formal or formless)
could be justified because the check-the-box conversion is itself a fiction
and, unlike state law incorporations, lacks non-tax significance. As to
the authorities regarding transfers of partnership interests, the technical
termination rules under Section 708 and Revenue Ruling 99-6 are inconsistent
with each other.165 Reconciling these authorities is outside the scope of
this Article, but given the inconsistency, it is impossible for the treatment
of partnership restructurings to be consistent with both. Nevertheless, the
proposed Partnership Restructuring Election draws a little bit from each;
the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election uses an assets-over
default rule, which is aligned with the treatment of technical terminations,
and the proposed Partnership Restructuring Election allows an interestsover fiction for partnership mergers, which is in accord with Revenue
Ruling 99-6’s treatment of the acquisition of all interests in a partnership
by one person.

164. See supra note 13 (discussing the evolution of the tax treatment of partnership
mergers and divisions); Rev. Rul. 70-239, 1970-1 C.B. 74 (concluding that all partnership
incorporations have the same tax consequences as assets-over incorporations prior to
Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88).
165. See supra Part III.B.3.b.

306

FIELD.DOC

[VOL. 44: 259, 2007]

8/16/2007 10:22:29 AM

Fiction, Form, and Substance
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

By expanding the use of fictions, the proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election promotes flexibility. Flexibility is both an expressly stated goal
of Revenue Ruling 84-111’s conclusion that different incorporation
constructs have different tax consequences, and, with respect to the
allocation of tax burdens of partnership transactions among partners, it is
“[o]ne of the principal legislative objectives of Subchapter K.”166 This
increased flexibility ought not to increase the risk of abuse since the
proposed Partnership Restructuring Election does not give partnerships
any tax options that were not already implicitly available.167 Rather, the
election merely removes the non-tax barriers from the use of the tax
constructs. Moreover, since the parties to the transaction would all be
obligated to agree on and be bound by the chosen fiction, the risk of
government whipsaw is not increased by this decreased emphasis on
form and expanded use of fictions. Additionally, the current anti-abuse
provisions would be retained for partnership mergers and divisions and
expanded to cover incorporations, which would also help mitigate the
risk of abuse.
The proposed Partnership Restructuring Election would be a
simplifying and easily administrable change. Because there would be
one default rule and because the election would only allow for three
alternative constructs,168 the rules would be relatively easy to follow.
Nuanced rules about how to qualify for assets-up treatment would be
removed, and taxpayers and the IRS would not have to spend time
analyzing how to comply or determining whether taxpayers have
complied, respectively, with the particular requirements for the different
tax constructs. An election does increase the filing burden from an
administrative perspective, but the filing should not be any more complicated
166. MCKEE ET AL., supra note 16, at ¶ 1.03 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65
(2d Sess. 1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4044.
167. Furthermore, Section 754 allows partnerships to elect whether or not to adjust
inside basis upon the occurrence of certain events that could cause outside basis to be
adjusted. I.R.C. § 754 (2000). Making or failing to make this election can be a common
reason why the partnership’s basis in its assets may differ from the partners’ bases in
their partnership interests, and hence why there might be a difference in the tax consequences
depending on whether the assets-over, assets-up, or interests-over constructs apply. To
the extent that making or not making the Section 754 election is the source of the
disparate tax treatment, the Partnership Restructuring Election would merely afford the
partnership a choice that Subchapter K has already concluded that partnerships should be
allowed to make.
168. See supra note 127 (discussing why this Article’s proposal allows for only
three possible constructs).
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than filings made in connection with a Section 338 election,169 and could
even be as simple as the one-page filing associated with making a checkthe-box election.170 Moreover, because there is a default rule, a filing
will often not be necessary at all.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this Article’s proposed Partnership Restructuring Election
is an acknowledgement that various forms for mergers, divisions, and
incorporations effectuate the same substantive transactions, which should,
and can, be treated the same way for tax purposes. The goal of like
treatment is accomplished by adopting a consistent approach to the use
of fiction and form in analyzing the tax consequences of these
substantively equivalent transactions. Rather than sometimes strictly
adhering to form (like Revenue Ruling 84-111 with respect to incorporations),
sometimes regarding purported “form” with some fictional caveats (as
with the requirements for the assets-up construct in partnership mergers
and divisions) and sometimes disregarding form entirely in favor of only
one fiction (as with merger and division structures not meeting the
assets-up or assets-over requirements), the proposed Partnership Restructuring
Election lets form (or formlessness) be merely a reflection of the
business needs of the parties and uses a single set of elective fictions
to determine the tax consequences of the transaction. This proposal
results in an increasingly prominent role for fiction in the tax analysis of
partnership transactions, but justifiably so. Fiction can be an incredibly
valuable tool for interpreting transactions to reflect coherent tax policy,
assuming we are willing to see the truth in the lie.171

169. Elections Under Section 338 for Corporations Making Qualified Stock
Purchases, I.R.S. Form 8023 (rev. Feb. 2006); Asset Allocation Statement Under Section
338, I.R.S. Form 8883 (Oct. 2002).
170. Entity Classification Election, I.R.S. Form 8832 (rev. Mar. 2007).
171. “And after all what is a lie? ’Tis but The truth in masquerade . . . .” LORD
BYRON, DON JUAN 406 (T.G. Steffan et al. eds., Yale Univ. Press 1973) (1823).
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